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INFLATIONARY TRENDS IN LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
BENJAMIN VAN ROOIJ AND PIP NICHOLSON* 
This Article analyzes two seemingly contradictory trends in the study and 
practice of law and development.  First, it looks at the ever-rising level of 
expectations and ambitions about what law can do for development.  
Second, it looks at the increasingly vocal criticism and frustration, both 
from inside and outside the field, that law often fails to achieve the desired 
developmental effects.  This Article argues that there is a relationship 
between increasing ambition and lack of impact.  More particularly, it 
suggests that increasing ambition produces limited impacts but that lack of 
impact, ironically, leads to recommendations to increase ambition.  This 
Article concludes that this linked evolution originates first from forces 
outside of the law and development domain, such as increasing pressures 
on aid efficacy, shifts in developmental paradigms, and increased 
geopolitical pressures to bring law into post-conflict states and peace-
building efforts.  The relationship between ambition and lack of impact is 
also internal to the field, however.  Scholars and practitioners operate 
cyclically, criticizing existing practices in order to launch new and often 
bolder developments.  This Article calls for a break from these cycles, a 
return to basic interventions that seek to make incremental improvements 
in the functioning of law in the context of development, and a shift from 
lofty overarching paradigms that obscure and disappoint, rather than aid, 
development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today the field of Law and Development is resurgent.  After its self-
pronounced death in the early 1970s,1 a simmering existence in the early 
1980s,2 and a gradual resurrection in the early 1990s,3 especially with the 
World Bank’s discovering of the rule of law as a vital element of its 
economic development work,4 the last decade has seen a virtual explosion 
of projects and studies5 concerning the improvement of law in developing 
countries.  Some of this work calls itself “law and development,”6 “law and 
economic development,”7 or “law and economic growth.”8  Other terms 
 
 1.  See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on 
the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (providing the 
most influential criticism at the time of how law and development practice and studies were ineffective 
and a form of neocolonialism). 
 2.  There are not many studies of law and development in that period.  See, e.g., Antony Allott, 
Development for What? – False Gods and Holy Writ, 1984 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1; G. W.  
Kanyeihamba, The Rule of Law, Judicialism and Development, 1984 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 100; 
James C.N. Paul, Law and Development into the ‘90s: Using International Law to Impose 
Accountability to People on International Development Actors, 1992 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 1. 
 3.  See, for example, Robert B. Seidman, The Fatal Race: Law-Making and the Implementation 
of Development Goals, 1992 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 79 and Brian Z. Tamanaha, Review Article: 
The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies,  89 AM. J. INT’L L. 470 (1995) for the first signs of this. 
 4.  Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic 
Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 269 
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
 5.  The body of work undertaken by donors, nongovernmental organizations, and consultants 
will, for ease of reference, be called “allied studies” throughout this Article. 
 6.  See, e.g., LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (John 
Hatchard & Amanda Perry-Kessaris eds., 2003). 
 7.  See, e.g., THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 
4. 
 8.  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737 (2002). 
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used include “legal reform in developing countries,”9 “legal technical 
assistance,”10 “rule-of-law promotion,”11 “legal empowerment” for the 
poor,12 and enhancing “access to justice” for the poor.13  This Article 
defines the field of Law and Development to encompass deliberate efforts 
to improve the functioning of law in developing and transitional nations (as 
well as studies on how to do so) and the ideas about law in relation to 
development that animate such work.14 
This Article explains the ways in which law and development has 
increased expectations and ambitions even as criticisms and reviews have 
concurrently increased questions about the capacity of law and 
development initiatives to have their desired impact.  This Article argues 
that there is a relationship between increasing ambition and lack of impact.  
It argues that increasing ambition produces limited impacts but that, 
ironically, lack of impact leads to recommendations to increase ambition.  
This Article concludes that this linked evolution originates first from forces 
outside of the law and development domain, such as increasing pressures 
on aid efficacy, shifts in the developmental paradigms, and an increased 
geopolitical push to bring law into post-conflict states and peace-building 
efforts.  The relationship between ambition and lack of impact is also 
internal to the field, however.  Scholars and practitioners operate cyclically, 
criticizing existing practices in order to launch new and often bolder 
developments.  The field of law and development has expanded in terms of 
not only its levels of investment but also the number of people working in 
it and its geographical reach.  The fundamental goals for law and 
development have also changed. 
 
 9.  See, e.g., LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES (Tim Lindsey ed., 
2007). 
 10.  See, e.g., Scott Newton, The Dialectics of Law and Development, in THE NEW LAW AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 4, at 174, 188. 
 11.  See, e.g., PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (Thomas 
Carothers ed., 2006). 
 12.  See, e.g., Stephen Golub, The Legal Empowerment Alternative, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF 
LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 161. 
 13.  See, e.g., Michael R. Anderson, Access to Justice and Legal Process: Making Legal 
Institutions Responsive to Poor People in LDCs (Inst. of Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 178, 2003). 
 14.  See John Ohnesorge, “Beijing Consensus” Anyone?, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 257, 
257 (2010) (defining the law and development field “to encompass the activities of legal assistance 
providers, as well as the ideas about law, and about development economics, that animate their work”); 
David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development Theory 
and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 4, at 1 (defining law and development as a body of ideas “about law 
and economic development that have been employed not just by academics but also by development 
practitioners responsible for allocating funds and designing projects”). 
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More specifically, this Article argues that since the resurrection of law 
and development in the 1990s, there have arisen seven core paradigms, 
each of which has expanded the field’s ambitions: Neo-Institutional 
Development, Rights-Based Development, Rule of Law, Bottom-Up 
Justice, Customary Justice, State-Building, and Transitional Justice.  This 
Article demonstrates that with the development of these paradigms, law 
and development has moved quickly from seeking to improve legal 
education, legal professionalism, and the quality of legislation to much 
loftier goals, such as enhancing macroeconomic growth, decreasing income 
inequality, providing basic human needs, building the rule of law, ensuring 
access to justice for all, empowering the disadvantaged, delivering post-
conflict justice, and building peace and nations. 
The changing conceptualization of development and the role of law in 
development has created a challenge for academics, policymakers, and 
practitioners, as ever more activities are being categorized as belonging to 
the field of law and development even though they actually have different 
meanings for different stakeholders.  For some, law and development is 
chiefly about understanding the causal relationship between law and 
macroeconomic growth,15 while for others it is about the actual reform of 
legal practices and their developmental impact.16  The conceptualization 
also challenges those analyzing causality between law and the broadened 
scope of development, whether for evaluative or academic purposes. 
While law and development has become increasingly ambitious, the 
field has increasingly sought to demonstrate impact.  Practitioners and 
scholars have sought to demonstrate a causal relationship between law or 
legal reform and the formulated goals.  This has caused an expansion of 
budgets for project evaluations or evaluative research.  Moreover, it has led 
to the rapid increase in indicators that can be used to connect legal system 
reform to aspects of development, many of which have also been 
criticized.17 
 
 15.  See, e.g., KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS: THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT (2006); Donald C. Clarke, What Kind of Legal System is Necessary for Economic 
Development? The China Puzzle, in LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES, supra 
note 9, at 65; Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and 
Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 895 (2008); John K.M. Ohnesorge, 
Developing Development Theory: Law and Development Orthodoxies and the Northeast Asian 
Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 219 (2007). 
 16.  See, e.g., BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW  
(Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003); THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 4; PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF 
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11. 
 17.  See Linn Hammergren, Indices, Indicators and Statistics: A View from the Project Side as to 
Their Utility and Pitfalls, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 305 (2011). 
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As a result, law and development has set itself up for failure: 
expanding its ambition to extremely high levels, while concurrently 
increasing the demand for evidence that it can realize these ambitions in the 
face of criticism.  Given the mismatch between ambition on the one hand 
and demonstrated impact and criticism on the other, the question arises: 
why has there not been a move toward humbler and more realizable goals? 
This Article analyzes the development of ambition and impact both 
separately and in terms of the ways in which they interact.  It demonstrates 
that there is a relationship, or “partial co-evolution,” between rising 
ambition and growing attention to and criticism of lack of impact.  This 
Article finds that the loftier the ideals, the more is invested in measuring 
and demonstrating their implementation, which is accompanied by 
increasing worry about whether the goals will be achieved.  This in turn 
stimulates the development of more evaluation and indicators, which, due 
to the difficulty of showing causality between the goals and the law, as well 
as the impossibility of implementing the goals, results in further doubts 
about and dissatisfaction with impact.  This creates additional space for 
criticizing existing approaches and for propagating new alternatives and, 
ironically, generating even more ambitious approaches. 
In short, the greater the ambition, the greater the impact analysis; the 
greater the impact analysis, the greater the criticism; and then again the 
greater the ambition.  This Article argues that this “co-evolution” carries 
two consequences.  First, it produces fads in law and development, which 
have followed one another in rapid succession, often without fully 
replacing the old practices.  Second, it leads to limits on the space for the 
use of existing knowledge about the complexities of both developmental 
and legal processes. 
Part I describes the rise in ambition.  Part II details the increasing 
worry about and criticism of the impact of the new goals. 
I. INCREASING AMBITION IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
PARADIGMS 
The first American-led law and development movement occurred in 
the 1960s and early 1970s.  Based on ideas borrowed from American legal 
realists, this movement sought to reform the legal systems of developing 
countries intent on constructing liberal states and spreading democracy.18  
In the early 1970s, the movement came to an abrupt end following fierce 
criticism by the scholars who had originally participated in its projects.  
One criticism alleged arrogance and unrealistic ambition: after all, a 
 
 18.  Trubek & Galanter, supra note 1, at 1063, 1073–74. 
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movement that seeks to change political and legal culture abroad while 
lacking sufficient theoretical underpinning and local knowledge is clearly 
overly ambitious.19 
It is therefore all the more surprising to see the field resurgent less 
than two decades later.  Further, this reincarnation is not humble but is 
rather law and development “on steroids,” seeking to effect many types of 
development through law and legal reform.  It reaches far beyond the realm 
of the original American law and development movement.  This rapid 
expansion of the field is best captured by analyzing the seven core 
paradigms that have emerged and that now inform law and development: 
Neo-Institutional Development, Rights-Based Development, Rule of Law, 
Bottom-Up Justice, Customary Justice, State-Building, and Transitional 
Justice. 
A. Neo-institutional Development and Rights-Based Development 
Development refocused on law in the 1980s when certain ideas about 
the role of institutions for economic growth emerged.  With the rise of 
neoliberalism and its focus on markets, neo-institutional scholars saw legal 
institutions (most notably enforceable contracts and secure property rights) 
as key to fostering economic growth.20  A market-friendly legal system that 
allows minimal interference from the state was seen as a prerequisite for 
economic growth.21  These economic conceptions of the role of law entered 
the development field through ideas such as “good governance” and “the 
rule of law,” which at the time were defined primarily in terms of market 
facilitation.22 
Meanwhile, the concept of development itself expanded and moved 
away from a singular focus on macroeconomic growth towards an 
emphasis on broader socioeconomic needs.  Especially with the emergence 
of the “human development” approach in the 1980s, development came to 
mean more than economic growth or income equality.23  For instance: 
 
 19.  See id. at 1090; Trubek & Santos, supra note 14, at 6. 
 20.  See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 3–10 (1990) (discussing the influence of societal institutions on economic change); 
Douglass C. North, Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction, 17 WORLD DEV. 
1319 (1989) (assesing the historical impact of institutions and institutional frameworks in the 
development of economies). 
 21.  Santos, supra note 4, at 268. 
 22.  David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future, 
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 4, at 74, 85. 
 23.  KATIE WILLIS, THEORIES AND PRACTICES OF DEVELOPMENT 6–8 (2005); Des Gasper, Human 
Rights, Human Needs, Human Development, Human Security: Relationships Between Four 
International “Human” Discourses 19 (Inst. of Soc. Studies, Working Paper No. 20/07, 2007). 
VAN ROOIJ AND NICHOLSON MACRO(DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2014  3:27 PM 
2013] INFLATIONARY TRENDS IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 303 
 
[The human development approach] stresses the lack of adequate 
connection between levels of monetised activity and levels of well-
being: there are many other determinants of well-being, and frequently 
weak or unreliable or perverse links to well-being from economic 
growth.24 
 
Even the World Bank, a strong proponent of economic growth, 
incorporated social concerns into its Comprehensive Development 
Framework in 1999.25  The rise of the human rights movement offered yet 
another approach to development beyond that of macroeconomic growth, 
grounded in individualism and focusing on the rights of the poor,26 under 
which development is “a process of expanding the real freedoms that 
people enjoy.”27  Elemental to the concept of development as freedom is 
the emphasis on the physical security of persons, as well as a person’s 
“ability to secure and hold basic goods.”28  Law became a key factor in 
securing the protection of rights and freedom through development.  
Moreover, the increasing momentum of the human rights movement and 
the recognition that the protection of internationally-recognized human 
rights required domestic legal reforms brought law and development back 
to the fore.29 
Broadening development objectives and consequent changing 
expectations have resulted in ever greater ambition for the role of law in 
development as a way to increase macroeconomic growth and to decrease 
inequality, improve sustainable development, strengthen freedom and 
rights protection, and empower the disadvantaged across the globe. 
B. Rule of Law 
In the 1990s, the “rule of law” emerged as a central concept in 
 
 24.  Gasper, supra note 23, at 19. 
 25.  Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second-Generation Reforms and the 
Incorporation of the Social, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, 
supra note 4, at 203, 203–04; Santos, supra note 4, at 253, 268, 275. 
 26.  See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) (placing the individual at 
the center of development and identifying individual freedoms as the most effective means for 
enhancing development and reducing poverty); Paul Gready & Jonathan Ensor, Introduction, in 
REINVENTING DEVELOPMENT?: TRANSLATING RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES FROM THEORY INTO 
PRACTICE 1, 1–6 (Paul Gready & Jonathan Ensor eds., 2005) (summarizing the second revolution in 
human rights, during which these rights began to be seen as existing beyond narrow legalistic terms and 
also became part of a broader, “rights-based” approach to development). 
 27.  SEN, supra note 26, at 3. 
 28.  Gasper, supra note 23, at 21. 
 29.  Trubek, supra note 22, at 84. 
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development.30  The rule of law became so popular because it uniquely 
bridged the neo-institutional and human rights ideas that had dominated the 
development policies of Western and international donors in the early 
1990s.31  The rule of law became in particular a key concept of the World 
Bank’s good governance agenda, which allowed the Bank to move beyond 
its original economic mandate into the area of substantial policy and 
politics.32 
With the adoption of the rule of law as the major law and development 
paradigm, a complex and sometimes conflicting set of ambitious goals 
entered the field.  Originally, the World Bank chiefly used a thin, trimmed 
down conceptualization of rule of law33 that focused on procedure.34  This 
conceptualization was based on the following tenets: there is a set of rules 
that are known in advance; the rules are in force; mechanisms exist to 
ensure the proper application of the rules, and any departure from the rules 
has to follow established procedures; conflicts in the application of the 
rules can be resolved through binding decisions of an independent judicial 
body; and there are procedures for amending rules that no longer serve 
their purpose.35  In its 1994 approach, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), in contrast, used a “thicker” conceptualization that 
 
 30.  Thomas Carothers, The Rule-of-Law Revival, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN 
SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 3, 3 (“One cannot get through a foreign policy debate these 
days without someone proposing the rule of law as a solution to the world’s troubles.”). 
 31.  Trubek, supra note 22, at 84–85. 
 32.  Santos, supra note 4, at 269–70. 
 33.  Much contention exists, both in academia as well as among practitioners, about the definition 
of the “rule of law.”  Scholars distinguish between thick and thin conceptualizations of the rule of law.  
The thick conceptualization views the rule of law as necessarily comprising “certain universal moral 
principles, inherently liberal in character,” such as freedom and equality.  Thom Ringer, Note, 
Development, Reform, and the Rule of Law: Some Prescriptions for a Common Understanding of the 
“Rule of Law” and Its Place in Development Theory and Practice, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 
178, 190 (2007) (footnote omitted).  This conceptualization is also associated with constitutional 
protection of the rights to vote, to political equality, and to private property.  CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 7 (2001); Ringer, supra, at 191.  Critics of such a 
thick conceptualization argue that the rule of law “is not to be confused with democracy, justice, 
equality . . . human rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of man.”  JOSEPH RAZ, 
The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 211 
(2d ed. 2009).  This criticism is ultimately based on the idea that “[i]f the rule of law means everything, 
does it still mean anything?”  Ringer, supra, at 193.  Scholars have, in response, developed a thin 
conceptualization of the rule of law, which stresses the predictability and rationality of rules, distilling 
out any moral content or preference about political institutions beyond the realm of law.  Id.  Critics of 
such attempts claim that this moral distillation is futile, as the thin conceptualization of the rule of law 
still contains moral choices about the kind of law and legal system that is best.  Id. at 195 (citing 
MICHAEL NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW: POLITICIZING ETHICS 13–14 (2002)). 
 34.  Santos, supra note 4, at 270. 
 35.  Id. 
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incorporated political and civil human rights and elements of a 
constitutional democracy.36 
The two conceptualizations subsequently converged, as exemplified 
by the World Bank’s adoption of a broader approach to rights-based 
development and rule of law.  For example, the Bank stated that “a well 
functioning legal and judicial system is critical both as an end in itself as 
well as a means to facilitate and leverage the achievement of other 
development objectives.”37  The Bank’s current usage of the term “rule of 
law” includes different versions of the concept that “converge in a hodge-
podge articulation.”38  One such usage highlights the rule of law’s 
importance for securing the social dimension of development, which, from 
the 1990s onwards, was increasingly seen as crucial.39  While originally the 
concept of the rule of law was seen as a means, through the protection of 
rights, to enhance the market and ensure that basic needs were met, it 
increasingly came to be seen as part of a wider concept of the development 
goal of good governance.40 
The Rule of Law paradigm crucially expanded the field of law and 
development, as it offered an integrated and comprehensive paradigm to 
guide law and development efforts away from singular, project-like 
interventions towards a broader transformative agenda.  Seeking to 
establish rule of law, whether as a means to development or as an end in 
itself and whether using “thin” or “thick” conceptualizations, necessarily 
entails a series of complex and multi-level interventions that are often 
based on legal normative goals, such as fundamentally changing the 
relationship between law and politics and institutionalizing professionalism 
and law enforcement.  These goals are frequently implemented in a top-
down manner and are largely developed in a different context from the one 
in which they are applied; they are thus not adapted to local conditions.  
Such expansion of the rule of law paradigm is highly ambitious, not least 
 
 36.  Ringer, supra note 33, at 192–93. 
 37.  LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, THE WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM 
5 (2004). 
 38.  Santos, supra note 4, at 276. 
 39.  See Rittich, supra note 25, at 203 (describing the incorporation of social concerns into “the 
mainstream agenda of market reform and economic development”); Santos, supra note 4, at 268 
(detailing the World Bank’s move, in response to criticism of its macroeconomic growth-focused 
structural adjustment programs, to make poverty reduction a central issue and to “focus on structural, 
social, and human concerns”).  The rule of law was also regarded as critical in the fight against 
corruption, which the World Bank started in 1996.  See Santos, supra note 4, at 273–75 (“In 1996, the 
[World] Bank announced its determination to begin projects aimed at fighting corruption . . . .”). 
 40.  See Rittich, supra note 25, at 209–10 (noting that international financial institutions have 
started to promote “increasingly comprehensive notions of good governance in a globally integrated 
economy” and that in the light of this new focus, legal reform has become central). 
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because its different objectives can be inherently conflicting: for instance 
there can be tensions between the rule of law’s goals of establishing law 
and order and binding the government to law.41 
C. Bottom-Up Justice 
The increasing focus on the relief of micro-level poverty and rights-
based development resulted in criticism of existing law and development 
programs for failing to focus on aspects of law that mattered directly in the 
lives of the poor and the weak.42  Out of this criticism emerged the Bottom-
Up Justice paradigm, which focuses on the legal needs of the poor and the 
disadvantaged.  Using terms such as “access to justice,”43 “justice for the 
poor,”44 “justice for all,”45 “legal empowerment,”46 “legal empowerment of 
the poor,”47 and “microjustice,”48 proponents have sought to develop a 
range of legal interventions that will have a more direct effect on the 
development of marginalized people. 
Major international development organizations such as the UNDP and 
the World Bank have made access to justice central to their law-related 
programming.  The UNDP’s access to justice approach, which “support[s] 
justice and related systems so that they work for those who are poor and 
 
 41.  See Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF 
LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 54 (discussing the multiple goals of the 
rule of law and their inherent conflicts). 
 42.  See, e.g., Stephen Golub, A House Without a Foundation, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW 
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, at 105; Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-
of-Law Orthodoxy, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 
11, at 75 (arguing that law “cannot be detached from its social and political environment”). 
 43.  See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, PRACTICE NOTE: ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004), 
available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-
governance/dg-publications-for-website/access-to-justice-practice-note/Justice_PN_En.pdf [hereinafter 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE]; UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, PROGRAMMING FOR JUSTICE: ACCESS FOR 
ALL: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
(2005), available at http://asia-
pacific.undp.org/content/dam/rbap/docs/Research%20&%20Publications/democratic_governance/RBA
P-DG-2005-Programming-for-Justice.pdf; Anderson, supra note 13. 
 44.  See, e.g., Justice for the Poor, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/ZRKELPETD0 (last 
updated Dec. 11, 2013). 
 45.  See, e.g., Justice for All, ASIAN DEV. BANK (Jan. 31, 2009), 
http://www.adb.org/features/justice-all. 
 46.  See, e.g., Lorenzo Cotula, Legal Empowerment to Secure Land Rights – Defining the 
Concept, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN 
AFRICA 7 (Lorenzo Cotula & Paul Mathieu eds., 2008); Golub, supra note 12. 
 47.  See, e.g., 1 COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, MAKING THE LAW WORK FOR 
EVERYONE: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR 3 (2008). 
 48.  See, e.g., MAURITS BARENDRECHT & PATRICIA VAN NISPEN, MICROJUSTICE (Tilburg Law & 
Econ. Ctr., Discussion Paper 2008-010, 2008). 
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disadvantaged,”49 is based in the idea that “access to justice is a basic 
human right as well as an indispensable means to combat poverty, prevent 
and resolve conflicts.”50  The approach explicitly recognizes that justice 
systems can be found in both formal state institutions and informal non-
state normative systems.51  The World Bank’s “Justice for the Poor” 
program is similar: 
 
Justice for the Poor (J4P) is an attempt by the World Bank to grapple 
with some of the theoretical and practical challenges of promoting justice 
sector reform in a number of countries in Africa (Kenya and Sierra 
Leone) and East Asia (Indonesia and Cambodia).  J4P reflects an 
understanding of the need for demand-oriented, community-driven 
approach to justice and governance reform, which values the 
perspectives of the users, particularly the poor and marginalized such as 
women, youth and ethnic minorities.52 
 
These two approaches augment the existing paradigm of the rule of law, 
thus expanding the scope of law and development efforts to address the 
needs of the poor. 
A second category, “legal empowerment,” can be defined as “the use 
of legal services, often in combination with related development activities, 
to increase disadvantaged populations’ control over their lives.”53  Legal 
empowerment offers an antidote to “the problematic, state-centric rule-of-
law orthodoxy” and enables law to operate as a mechanism for instituting 
“broader socioeconomic development initiatives.”54  Such empowerment 
occurs 
 
when the poor, their supporters, or governments—employing legal and 
other means—create rights, capacities, and/or opportunities for the poor 
that give them new power to use law and legal tools to escape poverty 
and marginalization.  Empowerment is a process, an end in itself, and a 
means of escaping poverty.55 
 
Legal empowerment approaches thus take the ambition of Bottom-Up 
 
 49.  ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 8. 
 52.  JUSTICE FOR THE POOR PROGRAM 1 (2006), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/J4POverviewDecember06.pdf. 
 53.  Golub, supra note 12, at 161. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  JOHN W. BRUCE ET AL., LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR: FROM CONCEPTS TO 
ASSESSMENT 29 (2007), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADM500.pdf. 
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Justice a step further as they seek not only to adapt law in the broadest 
sense to the needs of the poor but also, through legal intervention, to 
empower the poor to have control over their lives and to capitalize on their 
informal properties. 
Under this approach, law faces high expectations as a means to deal 
directly with poverty.56  The poor have especially limited access to legal 
institutions, and a state of “lawlessness” has an adverse impact on them.57  
Nevertheless, legal empowerment has helped alleviate poverty.58 
Bottom-Up Justice practitioners and scholars have conducted an in-
depth analysis of the diverse problems and challenges that need to be 
overcome to promote justice and legal empowerment for the poor and the 
weak, leading to a comprehensive and ambitious agenda for law and 
development that in practice adds to the already lofty ambitions of rule of 
law building.59  The particular challenges that this approach must 
overcome, including pervasive social and institutional practices such as 
corruption, gender bias, low legal awareness, lack of trust in formal 
institutions, and corruptive patron-client networks, are of the highest level 
of difficulty.60 
Most Bottom-Up Justice efforts are at least partially directed at 
enhancing legal awareness through education and rights awareness 
training; improving legal aid to the poor through the provision of legal 
clinics, public interest lawyers, and paralegals; developing alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms; supporting local dispute resolution 
institutions that already exist; and strengthening civil society in general.61  
This approach is most likely to be successful if conducted in a participatory 
manner that involves poor and weak stakeholders.  It should be based on 
their needs and preferences, although these are inevitably framed and 
interpreted by donors or their consultants,62 whose perception of 
 
 56.  See ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 4 (“Access to justice is a vital part of the UNDP 
mandate to reduce poverty and strengthen democratic governance.  Within the broad context of justice 
reform, UNDP’s specific niche lies in supporting justice and related systems so that they work for those 
who are poor and disadvantaged.”). 
 57.  Anderson, supra note 13, at 1–3. 
 58.  See ASIAN DEV. BANK, LAW AND POLICY REFORM AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 17–
19 (2000) (reviewing the role of legal empowerment in reducing poverty in the Philippines and 
Bangladesh); Golub, supra note 12, at 163, 166–68. 
 59.  See, e.g., Benjamin van Rooij, Bringing Justice to the Poor, Bottom-up Legal Development 
Cooperation, 4 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 286 (2012) (discussing the rise of bottom-up approaches and 
questioning their innovativeness and feasibility). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 58, at 10–12; ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 11–14; 
Golub, supra note 12, at 165. 
 62.  ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 58, at 85; ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 22; Golub, 
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stakeholder needs may diverge substantially from that of the stakeholders 
themselves. 
The Bottom-Up Justice approaches suggest several methods for 
achieving their goals.  For instance, several Bottom-Up Justice programs 
and studies call for “mainstreaming” legal sector activities: making them 
central to other sectors of development work, both in recipient countries as 
well as in donor institutions.63  Further, several studies have shown that 
bottom-up approaches require time and that tight project cycles and an 
overly large portfolio of programs should therefore be avoided.64  If 
possible, solutions should not be based on transplants of existing models 
but should rather be tailored to local realities.65  Finally, it is important to 
garner sufficient support for planned reforms and to overcome capture and 
undue influence by vested interests.66 
At face value, targeted interventions, such as legal awareness building, 
paralegal training, or development of ADR mechanisms, might seem less 
difficult than the broader agenda of building the rule of law.  Even specific 
interventions can become highly complex, however, when tried over a 
larger scale and when faced with problems, such as corruption, social bias, 
and lack of trust, that are deeply embedded within sociopolitical structures 
and not easily changed.  In addition, if Bottom-Up Justice is ultimately 
about empowerment and changing existing power asymmetries, a 
seemingly boundless aspirational agenda emerges.  Moreover, there is a 
problem of scale with a bottom-up strategy.  How does one work bottom-
up but still reach sufficient populations within countries or regions?  A true 
bottom-up approach requires large investments in gathering and 
incorporating local knowledge into locally adapted projects.  This may 
limit the broader impact of such an approach, especially if it is to be 
achieved solely through a civil society that still needs to be built.  Finally, 
many of the goals cannot be achieved without a reasonably well 
functioning state and legal apparatus.  Continued efforts under the rule of 
law paradigm are thus required. 
D. Customary Justice 
Once the Bottom-Up Justice approach was established, scholars and 
 
supra note 12, at 167–68. 
 63.  ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 58, at 120–21; ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 10; 
Golub, supra note 12, at 170, 174–76. 
 64.  UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 43, at 10–11; Golub, supra note 12, at 170. 
 65.  ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 58, at 96; ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 9; Golub, 
supra note 12, at 164. 
 66.  ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 58, at 79–80; ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 8. 
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practitioners realized that perhaps a focus on formal legal systems was too 
narrow.  In the lives of marginalized people, state law plays only a minor 
role, while customary justice systems govern most social and economic 
issues and are thus crucial for pro-poor development.  From this conclusion 
arose the fifth law and development paradigm, Customary Justice, with 
which law and development moved into the realm of non-state law and 
openly admitted the plurality of legal systems. 
By the early 1990s, there was a recognition that customary justice 
systems could not be eradicated or ignored.67  Non-state normative systems 
are important because of their proximity to the poor and other identifiable 
groups (for example, entrepreneurs in Vietnam)68 and the fact that the 
world’s poor most often live in settings regulated by customary law and 
traditional authorities.69 
In some countries up to 80% of the population lives under non-state 
normative systems and has little contact with state law.70  These figures are 
supported by estimates that customary law “governs the daily lives of more 
than three-quarters of the populations of most African countries”;71 for 
instance, “up to 90 percent of cases in Nigeria are settled by customary 
courts.”72  Further, such non-state law and governance institutions are much 
more accessible for the poor: geographically, liguistically, and culturally.73  
Moreover, in practice, customary law also influences the operation of and 
 
 67.  See, e.g., 1 COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, supra note 46, at 25 (arguing 
that most of the poor often resort to or have to resort to informal legal institutions); DEP’T FOR INT’L 
DEV., BRIEFING: NON-STATE JUSTICE AND SECURITY SYSTEMS 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/SSAJ101.pdf; ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 43, at 8 (stating that the 
poor sometimes prefer traditional justice systems over formal ones); EWA WOJKOWSKA, DOING 
JUSTICE: HOW INFORMAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS CAN CONTRIBUTE 5 (2006), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/EwaWojkowska.pdf. 
 68.  See generally JOHN GILLESPIE, TRANSPLANTING COMMERCIAL LAW REFORM: DEVELOPING A 
“RULE OF LAW” IN VIETNAM  (2006); Quan Hien Nguyen, Social Structures of Contracts: A Case Study 
of the Vietnamese Market (Mar. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Melbourne), available 
at http://repository.unimelb.edu.au/10187/313. 
 69.  UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 43, at 101; Golub, supra note 42, at 116; 
Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Poor Justice or Justice for the Poor? A Policy Framework for Reform of 
Customary and Informal Justice Systems in Africa, in 2 THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: LAW, 
EQUITY, AND DEVELOPMENT 141 (Ana Palacio et al. eds., 2006); Gordon R. Woodman, Customary 
Law in Common Law Systems, IDS BULL., Jan. 2001, at 29. 
 70.  WOJKOWSKA, supra note 67, at 12. 
 71.  Odinkalu, supra note 69, at 143 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 72.  Id. at 144. 
 73.  UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 43, at 100–02; THE WORLD BANK, VILLAGE 
JUSTICE IN INDONESIA: CASE STUDIES ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, VILLAGE DEMOCRACY AND 
GOVERNANCE 27, 49 (2004). 
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affects reforms to the state legal system.74  Finally, non-state conduct 
norms may provide a foundation for nascent commercial activity.75  
Informal networks play a vital role in enabling economic activities, both in 
developmental settings where state institutions for the enforcement of 
contracts are not in place and in modern economies in which some contend 
that informal arrangements “are the chief building blocks of sustainable 
economic relationships.”76  All of this makes engaging with customary and 
other non-state law a necessary endeavor for law and development 
practitioners.77 
Law and development reformers have identified several traits of non-
state law that may stand in the way of development.  Core issues include 
elite capture,78 human rights protection (especially for women and 
marginalized members within the customary community),79 and the lack of 
integration of non-state arrangements into wider capital markets.80  The 
challenge, however, is to determine how to deal with these issues: how to 
influence the functioning of customary and non-state justice systems 
without undermining their accessibility and proximity, for example.  Some 
propose to do so through legal aid, human rights dialogues with elders, and 
community-based programs that raise legal awareness,81 but most have 
 
 74.  Laura Nader, Promise or Plunder? A Past and Future Look at Law and Development, in 2 
THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: LAW, EQUITY, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 69, at 87. 
 75.  Nguyen, supra note 68, at 39 (arguing that relational business practices are “deeply embedded 
in the institutional matrix of the market” and that the negotiation of contracts does not take place in the 
shadow of the law). 
 76.  Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Legal Institutions and Informal Networks, 
18 J. THEORETICAL POL. 40, 41 (2006). 
 77.  Julio Faundez, Should Justice Reform Projects Take Non-State Justice Systems Seriously? 
Perspectives from Latin America, in 2 THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: LAW, EQUITY, AND 
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 69, at 113. 
 78.  THE WORLD BANK, supra note 73, at 4; UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 43, 
at 101, 103. 
 79.  UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 43, at 102–03; Ann Whitehead & Dzodzi 
Tsikata, Policy Discourses on Women’s Land Rights in Sub-saharan Africa: The Implications of the Re-
turn to the Customary, 3 J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 67, 102 (2003); Leila Chirayath et al., Customary Law 
and Policy Reform: Engaging with the Plurality of Justice Systems 4 (Jul. 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2006/Resources/477383-
1118673432908/Customary_Law_and_Policy_Reform.pdf. 
 80.  See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE 
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 6–7 (2001) (arguing that the the fact that the poor’s property is 
regulated by informal and customary institutions excludes them from access to capital markets and thus 
keeps them poor). 
 81.  See Janine Ubink & Benjamin van Rooij, Towards Customary Legal Empowerment: An 
Introduction, in CUSTOMARY JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT 7 (Janine Ubink ed., 
Int’l Dev. Law Org., Legal and Governance Reform: Lessons Learned No. 3, 2011), available at 
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/312000/1/CustomaryJustice3.pdf. 
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sought, through more sweeping legal reforms, to integrate customary and 
non-state justice systems into the broader framework of state law, thus 
creating an external check on those systems.82 
Successful integration is highly ambitious, as it entails finding a way 
to steer existing cultural and political practices that are embedded in local 
tradition, knowledge, and power relations and that are by their unwritten 
nature not accessible to outsiders.  It also challenges state law, which must 
find a way to bridge two fundamentally different systems that may have 
different languages, procedures, substantive norms, and underlying 
sociopolitical historical contexts.  This challenge has existed around the 
globe for centuries, as indigenous peoples have sought recognition for their 
laws in, for example, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.83  Codifying 
custom into state law can be difficult, as doing so may affect the fluidity, 
informality, and accessibility of norms84 and also typically demands that 
choices between different versions of customary law, which may favor 
some while excluding others, be made.85 
Incorporation of non-state adjudicative bodies into the state legal 
sector is also challenging, as it does not automatically improve the 
procedural fairness of such institutions or increase their effectiveness in 
protecting human rights and weak groups.  Extra measures are necessary to 
legally oblige traditional authorities to respect human rights and to comply 
with certain procedures and also to make sure that justice seekers can 
challenge infringements of these rules—through appeals to state courts, the 
results of which are then enforced in the local community, for instance.  
Nevertheless, this integration may only have a limited effect on the 
problems involved in using non-state law for development.86  Unless 
 
 82.  Several ways of integrating or combining state and non-state law—including full 
incorporation, limited incorporation, and coexistence—have been proposed.  See WOJKOWSKA, supra 
note 67, at 25–29 (providing a useful overview of the different options and forms of such integration, or 
“linkages,” of state and non-state law).  Under full incorporation the non-state law is “given a formal 
role within the formal state justice system.”  Id. at 26.  State law incorporates non-state law through, for 
instance, codification, a restatement of non-state norms, the incorporation of customary courts into the 
formal state structure, or the establishment of special branches of local courts to deal with customary 
cases.  Id. at 25–29. 
 83.  See generally P.G. MCHUGH, ABORIGINAL SOCIETIES AND THE COMMON LAW: A HISTORY 
OF SOVEREIGNTY, STATUS, AND SELF-DETERMINATION (2004). 
 84.  Ubink & van Rooij, supra note 81, at 12. 
 85.  Martin Chanock, Neither Customary Nor Legal: African Customary Law in an Era of Family 
Law Reform, 3 INT’L J.L. & FAM. 72 (1989). 
 86.  Erman Rajagukguk, Legal Pluralism and the Three-Cornered Case Study of Women’s 
Inheritance Rights Changing in Lombok, in LEGITIMACY, LEGAL DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE: LAW 
AND MODERNIZATION RECONSIDERED 213, 230 (David K. Linnan ed., 2012) (arguing that there is no 
coherent integration of adat laws and Islamic law relevant to women’s inheritance into the secular laws 
in Lombok). 
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customary norms have been codified, which is itself problematic, state 
judges may find it difficult to locate and apply the appropriate customary 
norm, especially if, for example, disputes arise as a result of large 
economic and social changes in the local community.87  In some countries, 
such as Ghana, customary or traditional law judges rely largely on case law 
developed by state judges in earlier decisions.88  Norms derived from case 
law, however, may not fit the “living” norms observed in the community.89  
Judges who do not use case law must rely on expert witnesses or assessors, 
who are allowed to define the appropriate norm from a body of fluid, 
sometimes contradictory, unwritten rules.90  The integration of state and 
non-state law in state courts is thus highly difficult and can easily lead to 
situations in which either court decisions are divorced from local realities 
and thus have limited impact or courts strengthen existing elites, who tend 
to assume a dominant role in the provision of information about contested 
norms.91 
With the rise of Customary Justice, law and development abandoned 
indirect methods of improving legal systems, such as encouraging the 
expansion of institutions and rights and enabling citizens to invoke such 
rights, and ambitiously sought to directly influence deeply set social norms 
and cultural practices without destroying their positive characteristics.  
Consequently, it had to contend with the immense complexities of 
unwritten legal systems that are fluid, contested, and deeply embedded in 
local power structures, cultural practices, and local knowledge.  The 
emergent Customary Justice paradigm added yet another layer of ambition 
 
 87.  See Janine Ubink, The Quest for Customary Law in African State Courts, in THE FUTURE OF 
AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 83, 91 (Jeanmarie Fenrich et al. eds., 2011) (discussing how customary 
norms became contested in Ghana when land value increased and chiefs and villagers had different 
ideas about who should reap the profits from this). 
 88.  JANINE UBINK, IN THE LAND OF THE CHIEFS: CUSTOMARY LAW, LAND CONFLICTS, AND THE 
ROLE OF THE STATE IN PERI-URBAN GHANA 190 (2008). 
 89.  Id. at 188. 
 90.  Ubink, supra note 87, at 93.  The complex nature of customary law itself also renders the 
discovery of the appropriate norms difficult, even with the assistance of reliable and knowledgeable 
witnesses and assessors.  First and foremost, what methodology should be used for determining what 
constitutes “living law”?  Is it, for instance, appropriate to simply ask traditional leaders or experts what 
the norm is?  Or, alternatively, should assessors look, where possible, at which norms have been applied 
in previous conflicts?  Or should they study which norms are in fact observed in everyday life?  If one 
follows the legal anthropological literature, the latter two options would work best to find the actual 
“living law.”  UBINK, supra note 88, at 219–20.  They require, however, a great amount of time and 
effort.  Customary norms have also increasingly become contested as a result of circumstances of 
“change, conflict and imposition; especially when the rights and duties of traditional authorities are part 
of the debate.”  Id.  In these cases, establishing which norm is used to solve disputes or is the observed 
norm in daily life is very difficult, if not impossible.  Id. 
 91.  Ubink & van Rooij, supra note 81, at 14. 
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to the paradigms discussed previously.  Law and development became an 
endeavour to promote social and economic development in the broadest 
terms, build rule of law, enhance access to justice, empower the weak and 
the poor, and successfully improve the functioning of customary justice 
systems despite their tenets being contested. 
E. Post-Conflict State-Building and Transitional Justice 
Law and development further expanded its ambitions with the 
emergence of the Post-Conflict State-Building and Transitional Justice 
paradigms.  These paradigms were developed during the 1990s as nations 
increasingly questioned what to do with countries that emerged from war or 
major internal conflicts.92 
Law and building the rule of law in particular were considered crucial 
elements for stability and development.  According to a consensus among 
international policymakers, the introduction of the rule of law should 
ideally be the basis for post-conflict reconstruction and democratization.93  
Bernard Kouchner, the senior UN official in Kosovo, famously stated that 
the single “most important lesson to be learned from Kosovo . . . is that 
peacekeeping missions need a judicial or a law-and-order ‘kit’ made up of 
trained police officers, judges and prosecutors, plus a set of potentially 
draconian security laws or regulations that are available upon their 
arrival.”94  Similarly, Lord Ashdown, the High Representative for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina from 2002 to 2006, summarized his experience by stating 
that the focus of a peacekeeping mission must be on the rule of law rather 
than on democracy “[b]ecause without the former, the latter is soon 
undermined.”95  The 2000 Brahimi panel report on UN peace operations 
also provided that “[t]hese missions’ tasks would have been much easier if 
a common United Nations Justice package had allowed them to apply an 
interim legal code to which mission personnel could have been pre-trained 
while the final answer to the ‘applicable law’ question was being worked 
out.”96 
The original Rule of Law paradigm thus became part of a broader and 
 
 92.  They were also developed as nations were faced with generally fragile states that were not in 
a post-conflict period, a situation not discussed in detail here.  See Francis Fukuyama, The Imperative of 
State-Building, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 17 (2004) (providing a general rationale for state-building). 
 93.  David Chandler, The Problems of “Nation-Building”: Imposing Bureaucratic “Rule from 
Above,” 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 577, 580 (2004). 
 94.  Ash Ü. Bâli, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in 
Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 431, 454 (2005). 
 95.  Chandler, supra note 93, at 579. 
 96.  Id. 
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much stronger and better-funded Post-Conflict State-Building paradigm, 
which has grown rapidly as both the UN and the United States have 
expanded their roles as post-conflict administrators and peace-, state-, and 
nation-builders over the last two decades.  Compared to prior UN missions 
that exercised executive power in West Guinea (1962–63), Cambodia 
(1992–93), and Eastern Slavonia (1996–98), the missions in Kosovo 
(1999–present)97 and Timor-Leste (East Timor) (1999–present)98 have 
exercised much broader powers and for the first time have become 
responsible for the full judicial power within these jurisdictions.99 
Nation-building (the broader version of state-building that includes 
constructing a national identity and replacing existing institutions)100 has 
become part of the war prevention agenda of the United States as that 
country has aggressively sought to reconstruct regimes that might pose it a 
threat.101  Thus, the preventive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan marked a full-
fledged effort at nation-building in which establishing the rule of law came 
to be seen as a central element.102  The U.S. strategy of nation-building and 
conducting preventive wars seeks to make these countries more favorable 
and less threatening to U.S. security and economic interests.103  The United 
States could not achieve these goals merely by toppling a regime, a state 
administration, and the administration of law; it had to assume 
responsibility for order and justice.104 
Building states and nations requires building law, and law and 
development has become part and parcel of the most ambitious modern 
efforts at social transformation.  Post-conflict rule of law projects are 
 
 97.  In Kosovo most law-related powers were assigned to the EULEX program in 2008.  Rule of 
Law Liaison Office, UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMIN. MISSION KOS., http://www.unmikonline.org/ 
Pages/rollo.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2012). 
 98.  This was actually a consecutive series of missions, the last of which was mandated in 2006 
following turmoil in Timor-Leste.  UNMIT Background, UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED MISSION IN 
TIMOR-LESTE, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmit/background.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2012). 
 99.  Simon Chesterman, Rough Justice: Establishing the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Territories, 
20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 69, 70, 94 (2005). 
 100.  Bâli, supra note 94, at 436. 
 101.  Kevin Green, Attacking Without Provocation; Maintaining a Subsequent Occupation; All for 
the Sake of Democratization: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of Preventive War and Post-Conflict 
Nation-Building, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 509, 518–19 (2009); John J. Hamre & Gordon R. Sullivan, 
Toward Postconflict Reconstruction, WASH. Q., Autumn 2002, at 83, 85. 
 102.  See Francis Fukuyama, Nation-Building 101, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 159 
(“A lot now rides on our ability not just to win wars but to help create self-sustaining democratic 
political institutions and robust market-oriented economies . . . .”). 
 103.  Green, supra note 101, at 519. 
 104.  SETH G. JONES ET AL., ESTABLISHING LAW AND ORDER AFTER CONFLICT xii (2005), 
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG374.pdf. 
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carried out in the most difficult areas, which have long histories of conflict, 
state failure, and limited knowledge of or familiarity with the rule of law as 
defined by Western organizations.105  Additionally, as in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the project developers are often part of the same organization 
that invaded and occupied the country and destroyed the political and legal 
institutions that are then restored and even improved according to Western 
liberal, constitutional, and democratic ideals, which have no local roots.106  
Further, reconstruction efforts may attract robust criticism, for example 
when they project Western rule of law into an Islamic law-based state.107 
To successfully contribute to state- and nation-building in fragile and 
post-conflict contexts is one of law’s most ambitious goals yet.  This is 
especially true in a transnational exercise where one nation-state or 
international body occupies a foreign territory, wholly or partly suspending 
local sovereignty: 
 
[D]epending on the conditions pertaining in the relevant territory prior to 
the intervention, nation-building may quite literally require the creation 
of a national identity, if no such preexisting shared identity unites the 
territory.  External nation-builders must assume core state 
responsibilities, including the provision of security and the exercise of 
political authority for the duration of the intervention.  At its most 
ambitious, external nation-building seeks to replace existing local 
institutions with new ones, often designed by foreign experts and 
imposed from above.108 
 
Meanwhile, during the 1990s, a Transitional Justice paradigm 
emerged and has sought to combine justice with peace through diverse, 
multi-level approaches, including amnesty, criminal and customary justice 
tribunals, and truth and reconciliation commissions.  An influential 
overview of transitional justice, developed by the UN in 2004, states that 
methods “may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with 
differing levels of international involvement (or none at all) and individual 
 
 105.  PER BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA: INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT 
TO LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, TRANSITION AND 
DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION 39 (2006). 
 106.  See Bâli, supra note 94, at 435–36 (describing, in the context of the U.S. and UK occupations 
of Iraq, the salient features of many nation-building efforts, including the creation of a national identity 
and the replacement of local institutions). 
 107.  See, e.g., Tarak Abdallah, Economy and Society: A Qur’anic Perspective, in LEGITIMACY, 
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE: LAW AND MODERNIZATION RECONSIDERED, supra note 86, at 
137, 148; Cyndi Banks, Note, Reconstructing Justice in Iraq: Promoting the Rule of Law in a Post-
Conflict State, 2 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 155, 160 (2010). 
 108.  Bâli, supra note 94, at 436. 
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prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and 
dismissals, or a combination thereof.”109  Under the Transitional Justice 
paradigm, state and non-state law are to fulfill complex functions, 
including consolidating peace; ensuring remembrance of past atrocities; 
and ensuring restorative, retributive, and distributive justice, all in post-
conflict contexts.110  To bolster many transitional justice goals, truth 
commissions can “help establish the truth, provide redress for victims, 
ensure accountability for perpetrators, identify and stimulate reforms and 
preventative effects, promote reconciliation, and create formal distance 
with the past.”111 
Transitional Justice has really taken off, as is evidenced by the 
expansion of truth commissions; local, regional, and international post-
conflict tribunals; and increased financial support.  According to one study, 
5% of development aid to Rwanda and Guatamala between 1995 and 2005 
was dedicated to supporting transitional justice projects.112 
With the State-Building and Transitional Justice paradigms, law and 
development has moved into its most ambitious phase.  The key challenge 
is finding ways to enable law to foster development in situations in which 
law has been non-existent or highly unjust and major supporting 
conditions, such as safety, a basic functioning of the state, and trust in state 
institutions, are lacking.  As State-Building and Transitional Justice require 
Law and Progress, Rule of Law, Bottom-Up Justice, and Customary Justice 
to function together, all of the paradigms converge here, resulting in 
limitless ambition. 
II. QUESTIONS ABOUT AND CRITICISM OF THE IMPACT OF LAW 
AND DEVELOPMENT 
After over sixty years of international developmental aid, there is 
doubt about the effectiveness of law and development.113  Especially with 
 
 109.  U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004). 
 110.  Wendy Lambourne, Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding After Mass Violence, 3 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 28, 37–45 (2009). 
 111.  Max du Plessis & Jolyon Ford, Transitional Justice: A Future Truth Commission for 
Zimbabwe?, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 73, 85 (2009). 
 112.  Roger Duthie, Toward a Development-Sensitive Approach to Transitional Justice, 2 INT’L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 292, 302 (2008). 
 113.  See, e.g., Paul Clements et al., Reducing World Poverty by Improving Evaluation of 
Development Aid, 29 AM. J. EVALUATION 195, 195 (2008); Hristos Doucouliagos & Martin Paldam, 
The Aid Effectiveness Literature: The Sad Results of 40 Years of Research, 23 J. ECON. SURVS. 433, 
433 (2009) (“The mix of casual evidence and the absence of a correlation between aid and growth have 
caused many to doubt the effectiveness of aid.”); William Easterly & Claudia R. Williamson, Rhetoric 
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the global economic downturn and the development of nationalist anti-aid 
politics in donor countries,114 the lack of demonstrable impact could 
undermine continued aid spending and support.  Donors, operators, and 
recipients are increasingly under pressure to demonstrate effectiveness.115  
Consequently, the aid community has paid more attention to defining, 
evaluating, and improving impact, agreeing on the need for indicators116 if 
not on the best method of measuring impact.  The 2005 Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action represent 
broad commitments to the impact of development aid.117 
A new industry of evaluators, evaluation designers, and related 
academic scholars has arisen to address this key issue.118  The Development 
Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD/DAC) has developed criteria for evaluation that most 
donors use as a common basis, despite differences in actual evaluation 
practices.119  Aid impact evaluation has moved from a focus on outcomes 
and impacts at a project level to impact evaluation at policy, strategy, 
country, and regional levels.120  At the same time, a whole range of 
indicators that can be used to study correlations of key variables (or their 
 
Versus Reality: The Best and Worst of Aid Agency Practices, 39 WORLD DEV. 1930, 1930 (2011) 
(“Despite the transfer of over $4.6 trillion (measured in constant 2007 dollars) in gross official 
development assistance (ODA) to developing countries from 1960 through 2008, a substantial amount 
of the world remains in extreme poverty and stagnant growth.”); Elizabeth M. King & Jere R. Behrman, 
Timing and Duration of Exposure in Evaluations of Social Programs, 24 WORLD BANK RES. 
OBSERVER 55, 55 (2009). 
 114.  This debate has played out in Australia, for example, where both conservative and Labor 
governments have reduced and delayed commitments to spend 0.5 % of GDP on foreign aid.  David 
Wroe, Coalition Takes Axe to Foreign Aid, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 6, 2013, http://www. 
smh.com.au/federal-politics/federal-election-2013/coalition-takes-axe-to-foreign-aid-20130905-2t89c. 
html. 
 115.  King & Behrman, supra note 113, at 55–56. 
 116.  Juan Carlos Botero et al., Indices and Indicators of Justice, Governance, and the Rule of Law: 
An Overview, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 153, 153 (2011). 
 117.  Camille Cameron & Sally Low, Aid-Effectiveness and Donor Coordination from Paris to 
Busan: A Cambodian Case Study,  LAW & DEV. REV., Dec. 2012, at 166, 170, 172–73 (describing the 
Paris Declaration as “an agreement to forge a ‘genuine partnership, with developing countries clearly in 
charge of their own development processes’” and noting that the Accra Agenda “calls for a focus shift 
from aid effectiveness to development outcomes”). 
 118.  Hammergren, supra note 17, at 307. 
 119.  MARTA FORESTI ET AL., OVERSEAS DEV. INST., SÉRIE NOTES MÉTHODOLOGIQUES NO. 1, A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EVALUATION POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES 8 
(2007); see also Jim Parsons et al., Justice Indicators for Post-conflict Settings: A Review, 2 HAGUE J. 
ON RULE L. 203 (2010) (discussing more generally work on justice indicators, which is also developing 
apace). 
 120.  FORESTI ET AL., supra note 119, at 8. 
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proxies) with various forms of development has emerged.121  Law and 
development as an increasingly prominent part of the development field 
has not escaped the pressure to demonstrate its effectiveness: 
 
Despite—or because of—the magnitude of the public and private funds 
being spent on rule of law promotion, its effectiveness continues to be 
questioned: by scholars, practitioners, donor and host country politicians 
and media. 
  Many donors have responded to this internal and external critique by 
investing heavily in mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating their 
projects and programs . . . .122 
 
Thus the field of law and development has not just expanded its 
ambition but has also become increasingly worried about the impact of law 
on development.  Ironically, this “industry” focus on indicators can itself 
delay or preclude local agencies from establishing their own evaluative 
processes.123  The remainder of this section examines what is known about 
the impact of law and development in its ever-growing realms, analyzing 
the relationship between law and development generally, taking up the 
issues in the section on neo-institutional and rights-based development and 
then considering the other five core paradigms.  It considers various 
criticisms of each paradigm, noting the ways in which such criticisms, in 
addition to the focus on measurement and impacts, have contributed to the 
escalating ambitions of the field. 
A. Mixed Causalities Between Law and Economic Growth 
There has been much scholarly interest in broadly establishing 
correlation or even causality between law and economic development.  
Evaluating this causal linkage produces mixed results but also 
fundamentally challenges scholars to find evidence for such causality.  
Generally this literature can be divided into optimists who argue that law 
stimulates economic growth and skeptics who do not find such a 
 
 121.  See, e.g., Elin Cohen et al., Truth and Consequences in Rule of Law: Inferences, Attribution 
and Evaluation, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 1 (2011); Amanda Perry-Kessaris, Prepare Your Indicators: 
Economics Imperialism on the Shores of Law and Development, 7 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 401 (2011); 
Veronica Taylor, The Law Reform Olympics: Measuring the Effects of Law Reform in Transition 
Economies, in LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES, supra note 9, at 83; 
Stephanie E. Trapnell, Actionable Governance Indicators: Turning Measurement into Reform, 3 HAGUE 
J. ON RULE L. 317 (2011). 
 122.  Cohen et al., supra note 121, at 107. 
 123.  Hammergren, supra note 17, at 305. 
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relationship.124 
Optimists argue that “[t]here is substantial evidence that some major 
legal rules and institutions (such as democracy, property rights, and certain 
government regulations) have a distinctly positive effect on growth”125 or 
that there is indication of a “strong correlation between the ‘rule of law’ 
and economic growth”126 (although correlation is not causation).  Indeed, 
scholars who have examined the role of law and legal institutions in Asian 
economic development between 1960 and 1995 have found evidence to 
suggest that law did affect economic development, depending on how 
countries approached the role of markets in the economy, but they admit 
that establishing exact linkages between law and economic growth is not 
easy, as there is a complex interplay of a multitude of factors.127  This 
relationship has also been positively reported in the legal origins and “Law 
and Finance” scholarship.  An influential paper that launched the latter 
field argues that countries with a legal system rooted in the common law 
fare better in financial development than those with continental legal 
systems.128 
Skeptics have been more doubtful about the causal link between legal 
institutions and economic growth.129  For example, Kenneth Dam’s work 
on the “law-growth nexus” questions the core thesis of law and finance that 
the origins of a legal system determine financial performance and disputes 
the idea that legal origins theory holds value for understanding broader 
economic performance.130  He argues that these fields of study fail to 
produce results that developing countries can use and that they 
oversimplify and ignore details that are vital to understanding how legal 
 
 124.  For an overview of this literature, see generally Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 15. 
 125.  Cross, supra note 8, at 1738–39. 
 126.  Katharina Pistor, There Is No Single Field of Law and Development, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 168, 168 (2009). 
 127.  KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 1960–1995, at 4–7 (1999). 
 128.  See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). 
 129.  See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, Legal Reforms and Development, 22 
THIRD WORLD Q. 21, 21 (2001) (“There is surprisingly little conclusive evidence that reforms in 
particular areas of law such as property law, contract law and human rights law have been effective in 
furthering development, however conceived.”); Richard E. Messick, Judicial Reform and Economic 
Development: A Survey of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117, 132 (1999) (finding that 
little is known of the actual effects of judicial reform on economic performance and counseling that “in 
the absence of a better theoretical understanding of the impact of judicial reform, care is required in 
designing and implementing projects”); Pistor, supra note 126, at 169–70 (“[W]e lack a sound 
theoretical basis for explaining why the correlation between legal development and economic growth 
holds across some countries, but breaks down in others. . . .  [W]e continue to know very little about the 
political economy of legal reforms and their distributional effects.”). 
 130.  DAM, supra note 15, at 5. 
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institutions actually influence economic activity, contending that other 
factors, including microeconomic policy initiatives, impact legal 
reforms.131  Some skeptics have suggested that a country’s receptivity to a 
transplanted law is more determinative of the prospects of the transplant 
than whether the country has a civil or common law legal system.132 
In the debate about law and economic growth, skeptics present East 
Asia as an important test case.  Neo-institutional and legal origin studies 
have difficulty explaining the extraordinary economic performance of 
countries such as China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.  Some scholars 
debate whether China demonstrates that economic growth requires clear 
property rights or enforceable contracts,133 whether it is an example of a 
country that has been able to do well economically even without formal, 
legally protected property rights,134 or indeed whether Asian “success” 
stories such as China demonstrate the importance of informal, reputation-
based institutions when state-provided rules “are unavailable or 
unenforced.”135 
Within the law and development literature of the last decade, there has 
been far less systematic study of the connection between law and the more 
broadly conceived approaches to development focusing on the individual 
and the poor that have become more influential.  One such study examined 
the link between law and six theoretical perspectives on development but 
found no clear evidence of law’s positive influence on development, 
however conceptualized.136 
A large-brush approach is necessary to analyze the impact of law and 
certain kinds of legal arrangements on economic growth, but such an 
approach is problematic.  Not only does it remain methodologically 
difficult to neatly filter the impact of law on economic growth from that of 
other contributory factors (whether natural, political, historical, or cultural), 
but the level of abstraction necessary to make general statements about the 
relationship between law and economic growth obscures vital details about 
particular kinds of legal arrangements.  Attempts at understanding such 
 
 131.  Id. at 207. 
 132.  See Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 
EUR. ECON. REV. 165, 167 (2003). 
 133.  See Clarke, supra note 15, at 66. 
 134.  See Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of Chinese 
Growth for Law and Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 551, 554–55 (2008) (arguing 
that such rights may not be a necessary condition for economic growth but are vital for dealing with 
distributional issues once growth develops). 
 135.  See Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia, 
34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 829, 834 (2000). 
 136.  See Davis & Trebilcock, supra note 129. 
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details produce findings not easily generalized.  In sum, disentangling the 
relationship between law and economic growth requires a level of detail 
combined with a level of cross-border historical data that is impossible to 
gather, analyze, and generalize.  The inherent inconclusiveness of this body 
of work raises a number of questions.  Can developing countries follow 
legal models of other more developed countries and hope, based on 
optimistic studies, that development will follow?  Should legal work be 
abandoned because of the lack of categorical proof of any economic 
benefit?  Is law only important for economic development? 
These questions raise concerns over the effect that the increasing 
emphasis on impact (especially quantitatively measured impact in terms of 
economic growth) will have on the understanding and improvement of the 
complex functioning of law and legal reform within a broader notion of 
development.  The studies discussed here simplify and obscure rather than 
explain.  It is too easy to blame solely the normative, mathematical, and 
quantitative approaches and methodologies used in the broader 
evaluations.137  It is more logical to look to the original ambitious goals that 
the field has adopted.  By contending that law can create economic growth, 
the field has opened itself to the economists and mathematicians whose 
simplified indicators and contrasting findings may undermine the field’s 
well-intended quest to improve the functioning of law in development. 
B. Criticism of Rule of Law Interventions 
Of all the law and development ambitions discussed here, the impact 
of the projects and programs seeking to advance the Rule of Law paradigm 
have received the strongest criticism.  In the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, the field of law and development at times resembled the American 
Law and Development Movement of the 1970s, with scholars and 
practitioners alike arguing that the Rule of Law paradigm, or Rule of Law 
Orthodoxy as it became known,138 had failed and should be replaced.139  
The discrepancy between the field’s highly raised expectations and its 
disappointing results was ultimately blamed in part on its original 
ambitions. 
Criticism centered chiefly on the wide range of activities that were 
undertaken to strengthen and build the rule of law in other countries.  Three 
levels of reform can be distinguished: namely substantive legislative 
 
 137.  See Perry-Kessaris, supra note 121, at 417 (arguing that the development of indicators to 
measure law and development has been a form of economic imperialism that uses a simplistic 
normative, mathametical, and quantifying approach). 
 138.  Upham, supra note 42, at 75. 
 139.  Golub, supra note 12, at 161. 
VAN ROOIJ AND NICHOLSON MACRO(DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2014  3:27 PM 
2013] INFLATIONARY TRENDS IN LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 323 
reform, institutional strengthening through training and financial support, 
and deeper institutional reform, such as the establishment of an 
independent judiciary, that relies “less on technical or institutional 
measures than on enlightened leadership and sweeping changes in the 
values and attitudes of those in power.”140  A general criticism of rule of 
law-oriented legal reform is that, despite these activities, it has been 
ineffective in bringing about development, especially with respect to the 
poor and the disadvantaged.141  Scholars have also emphasized that rule of 
law practice suffers from a lack of knowledge142 and particularly a lack of 
recognition of the plurality of law, a concept which must be integrated into 
legal development.143 
Several studies question the existence of proof that law can aid 
development,144 recalling the ambiguity of the findings about the causality 
of law and development discussed above.145  Others, still believing in the 
law’s capacity to contribute to development, argue that more data is needed 
to determine the kind of legal reform that leads to development146 and that 
successful legislative reforms should be based on thorough social scientific 
research about the norms and contexts of the target of the reform.147  In 
 
 140.  Carothers, supra note 30, at 8. 
 141.  See, e.g., id. at 15 (summarizing the lack of knowledge that rule of law practitioners have and 
the obstacles to knowledge and learning that exist); Golub, supra note 42, at 131 (discussing the lack of 
applied research as a foundation for rule of law reforms). 
 142.  See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW 
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note, at 11; Golub, supra note 42, at 131. 
 143.  See, e.g., H. Patrick Glenn, Sustainable Diversity in Law, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 39, 56 
(2011) (suggesting that “rule of laws” might form a better conceptual bedrock for activity in this area); 
Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Rule of Law and Legal Pluralism in Development, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 1, 
13–16 (2011) (suggesting that legal pluralism both challenges and may offer potential support for rule 
of law activity). 
 144.  See e.g., Golub, supra note 42, at 109–10; Upham, supra note 42, at 80–82 (questioning 
whether economic growth always needs formal institutions and whether it cannot also flourish in an 
informal economic and legal setting). 
 145.  See supra Part II.A. 
 146.  See, e.g., Carothers, supra note 142, at 25–27; Wade Channell, Lessons Not Learned About 
Legal Reform, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 11, 
at 137; Bryant G. Garth, Rethinking the Processes and Criteria for Success, in COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL 
AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT: TOWARD AN AGENDA FOR A JUST AND EQUITABLE SOCIETY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 11, 12 (Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck ed., 2001). 
 147.  See, e.g., PIP NICHOLSON, BORROWING COURT SYSTEMS: THE EXPERIENCE OF SOCIALIST 
VIETNAM 231–40 (2007); ANN SEIDMAN ET AL., LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL 
CHANGE: A MANUAL FOR DRAFTERS (2001); John Gillespie, Developing a Decentred Analysis of Legal 
Transfers, in EXAMINING PRACTICE, INTERROGATING THEORY: COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES IN ASIA 
25, 40–41 (Penelope (Pip) Nicholson & Sarah Biddulph eds., 2008) (arguing for the need to adopt a 
non-state centric focus when analyzing legal transfers and to use discourse analysis in such a study); 
Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Using Reason and Experience to Draft Country-Specific Laws, in 
MAKING DEVELOPMENT WORK: LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND 
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many developmental contexts, however, such research capacity may be 
limited, and getting policymakers and lawmakers to sufficiently research 
the contexts of reform initiatives is unlikely.148 
Criticism also suggests that the top-down character of rule of law 
reform projects does not sufficiently consider or incorporate local 
contexts.149  This allegedly arises because Western experts tend to take the 
context of their own jurisdiction for granted150 or because foreign experts, 
“[b]eing confident of their expertise and good intentions . . . are under no 
pressure to interrogate their own political and legal culture or to investigate 
in any depth that of the host country.”151  A combination of lack of 
knowledge and top-down policy and implementation may lead to 
unforeseen results152 that may even sometimes conflict with the original 
aims of reform and cause a deterioration of the local situation.153  In 
international legal development projects, which are the subject matter of 
most scholarly studies, such top-down operational methods further run the 
risk of ethnocentricity.154 
Legal scholars have also criticized rule of law reform as too state-
centered and overly focused on courts and the processes of lawmaking 
because it predominantly examines the aid or reform of state institutions.155  
Some scholars maintain that, as a result, the reforms will not reach the 
 
GOOD GOVERNANCE 249 (Ann Seidman et al. eds., 1999). 
 148.  NICHOLSON, supra note 147, at 237 (noting that academic sources about local legal systems 
often exist but are frequently not consulted); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Pragmatic Approach to Legislative 
Theory for Developing Countries, in MAKING DEVELOPMENT WORK: LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 147, at 145, 148, 150 (arguing 
that severe resource and time constraints preclude decent research). 
 149.  See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE 
WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES 4–5 
(2002); Julio Faundez, Legal Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries: Making Haste Slowly, 
in COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT: TOWARD AN AGENDA FOR A JUST AND 
EQUITABLE SOCIETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 146, at 369, 378; Golub, supra note 42, at 121 
(criticizing rule of law reformers for not paying sufficient attention to how local obstacles, including 
corruption and local politics, undermine reform efforts). 
 150.  Golub, supra note 42, at 127. 
 151.  Howard Dick, Why Law Reform Fails: Indonesia’s Anti-corruption Efforts, in LAW REFORM 
IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES,  supra note 9, at 42, 60. 
 152.  Garth, supra note 146, at 23–24. 
 153.  Faundez, supra note 149, at 380–81. 
 154.  See Garth, supra note 146, at 23–24 (“The problem is the same one that comes from thinking 
that what is widely accepted in the United States is universally valid.”); Tim Lindsey, Preface, in LAW 
REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES, supra note 9, at xix, xix–xx (emphasizing “the 
dangers that lie in an approach that ‘orientalises’ Asian societies”). 
 155.  See, e.g., Carothers, supra note 142, at 21; Golub, supra note 42, at 105–06; Nader, supra 
note 74, at 92, 107; Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Legal Pluralism and Social Justice in Economic and 
Political Development, IDS BULL., Jan. 2001, at 46, 46; Woodman, supra note 69, at 28. 
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poor, thus doing little to enhance their lives, and may even strengthen the 
position of existing elites.156  Skeptics further suggest that the state may not 
be well-positioned to help the poor and that more attention should be paid 
to civil society.157 
Furthermore, state-centered approaches lack effectiveness in contexts 
in which non-state normative systems are important and in which legal 
reform should address issues of legal pluralism.158  Some suggest that the 
adoption of a regulatory approach to law and development might enable a 
better understanding of the role of regulation in particular contexts and that 
this granular, decentered analysis of law will illuminate how best to 
develop it.159  The regulatory theorists caution that there is high risk in 
dichotomizing state and non-state actors and that there is a real need to 
recognize institutional hybrids of state and non-state actors and to explore 
“their broader relationship to the fragmented and multiple legal order.”160 
The top-down character of rule of law reform programs can be 
attributed in part to some donors, such as the World Bank and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, necessarily cooperating 
predominantly with national governments in targeted countries.161  As the 
legal systems in many developing states interact in complex ways with 
local, non-state justice systems as well, legal reform also requires 
engagement with those systems.162  Such activity, however, requires 
international development agencies to acquire “a considerable amount of 
knowledge of the complex political arrangements underlying [non-state 
justice systems] and adjunct structures.”163 
 
 156.  See, e.g., Golub, supra note 42, at 109–10; Vivek Maru, Access to Justice and Legal 
Empowerment: A Review of World Bank Practice, 2 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 259, 262–64 (2010); Taylor, 
supra note 121, at 98. 
 157.  See, e.g., Golub, supra note 42, at 110. 
 158.  Franz von Benda-Beckmann, The Multiple Edges of Law: Dealing with Legal Pluralism in 
Development Practice, in 2 WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: LAW, EQUITY, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra 
note 69, at 63 (arguing that the existence of legal pluralism can also constrain “interventionist 
objectives and practices”). 
 159.  See, e.g., Kanishka Jayasuriya, Institutional Hybrids and the Rule of Law as a Regulatory 
Project, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE 145, 
158 (Brian Z. Tamanaha et al. eds., 2012) (arguing that regulatory approaches might enable reformers 
to better understand regulatory dynamics and how to improve them in diverse locations). 
 160.  Jayasuriya, supra note 159, at 157. 
 161.  Linn Hammergren, International Assistance to Latin American Justice Programs: Toward an 
Agenda for Reforming the Reformers, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO 
THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 16, at 290–91. 
 162.  See von Benda-Beckmann, supra note 158, at 63–64 (“If local people keep their local law, 
exercise their own land rights, and go to traditional authorities for dispute management, it may have . . . 
to do with their reaction against state law and the social practices associated with it  . . . .”). 
 163.  Julio Faundez, Legal Pluralism and International Development Agencies: State Building or 
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Scholars further warn that rule of law practice is insufficiently aware 
of or naïve about its inherently political nature.164  Part of this criticism 
concerns the assumption that legal reform is mere “technical assistance,”165 
rendering reform efforts insufficiently attuned to underlying power 
structures and interests and inherently political questions and 
transformations.166  Vested interests, lack of political will, widespread 
corruption, and lack of demand among elites can render reform efforts 
directed at state institutions fruitless.167  General disinterest or resistance of 
the general public may be an even more formidable obstacle to successful 
legal reform.168  These facts are not always recognized in rule of law 
reform practice.169  As reforming law, even in a strictly technical sense, is 
 
Legal Reform?, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 18, 37 (2011). 
 164.  See David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, 
in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 4, at 95. 
 165.  See, e.g., S. Newton, Law and Development, Law and Economics and the Fate of Legal 
Technical Assistance, in LAWMAKING FOR DEVELOPMENT: EXPLORATIONS INTO THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROJECTS 23, 23 (J. Arnscheidt et al. eds., 2008). 
 166.  See, e.g., DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 149, at 5 (noting that law is at the core of power 
and that this centrality is crucial to analyses of the function of law in society); Dick, supra note 151, at 
53 (“The fundamental issue in reform is not the consistency of law but how the state, with all its 
ramifications, exercises its immense powers and in whose interests.”); Gary Goodpaster, Law Reform in 
Developing Countries, in LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL STATES, supra note 9, at 
107 (claiming that reforms are not sufficiently attuned to issues of power and politics). 
 167.  See Carothers, supra note 142, at 22 (noting that there has been little attempt to understand 
the “will” to reform, although it was identified some time ago); Golub, supra note 42, at 113, 116 
(arguing that legal reform projects fail when there is no support from local institutions and that energy 
spent on court reform, instead of on local “rules of the game” that affect the poor, are worthless); 
Goodpaster, supra note 166, at 130–31 (arguing that donor efforts to create political will where it is 
lacking are likely ineffective and should instead be directed at changing and neutralizing incentive 
structures and creating demand for law); see also Goodpaster, supra note 166, at 107 (arguing that the 
success of reform depends on taking into account existing social, economic, and cultural incentive 
systems and adapting reform-generated incentives accordingly).  For examples of failed legal reform 
due to elite intransigence, see LINN A. HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE REFORM 
IN LATIN AMERICA: THE PERUVIAN CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 270–71, 278 (1998) (arguing 
that the largely failed Peruvian legal reforms attracted interest only from a small group of lawyers and 
noting that elite disinterest in reforms is as problematic as elite opposition to them); Daniel Adler & 
Sokbunthoeun So, Toward Equity in Development When the Law Is Not the Law: Reflections on Legal 
Pluralism in Practice, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN 
DIALOGUE, supra note 159, at 83, 90 (arguing that the Cambodian land law reform experience, which 
tried to alter entrenched elite practices, was largely unsuccessful); Jeffrey A. Clark et al., The Collapse 
of the World Bank’s Judicial Reform Project in Peru, in LAW REFORM IN DEVELOPING AND 
TRANSITIONAL STATES, supra note 9, at 159, 172–73 (attributing the collapse of a large World Bank 
justice reform project in Peru to an indisputably clear case of executive disdain); Pip Nicholson & Sally 
Low, Local Accounts of Rule of Law Aid: Implications for Donors, 5 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 1, 36, 41–42 
(2013) (noting that the Vietnamese legal reform agenda is managed not by donors but by the Party-State 
and that many reforms bolster entrenched elites). 
 168.  HAMMERGREN, supra note 167, at 302. 
 169.  Id. at 270 (noting that reformers fail to appreciate that laws will not be implemented without 
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reforming power, reform efforts should adopt reforms that are favored by 
the local population. 
Further, there is a base question of whether foreign (usually Western) 
powers and their donor agencies have the moral authority to impose 
idealized notions of the rule of law in those states in which law is 
differently conceived and valued.170  Even if moral authority can be 
rationalized, where recipient country leadership is opposed to the 
ideological bases upon which rule of law projects are founded, prospects 
for the adoption of particular reforms are limited.171  As noted in the 
discussion of the transplant effect above, unsupported rule of law reforms 
will founder.172 
While all of these criticisms are more or less accurate, a final point of 
criticism is crucial: rule of law reform has made great promises it cannot 
fulfill.  Given the immense complexities that social engineering through 
law entails173 and its inherent resource, knowledge, and support limitations, 
expectations about the potential achievements of legal reform should be 
tempered. 
Further, the speed at which change is expected to occur is frequently 
unrealistic.174  Legal reform can only be successful if given sufficient time; 
haste and impatience are counterproductive.  Most law and development 
projects, however, run on short project cycles.175  Accordingly, law and 
 
local will and support); NICHOLSON, supra note 147, at 237 (arguing that Soviet legal aid to Vietnam 
also largely ignored local conditions); Newton, supra note 165, at 46 (advocating for research on costs, 
incentives, institutions, and impacts in order to determine how legal technical assistance might be 
relevant to a locality); Upham, supra note 42, at 76 (“Law . . . is seen as technology when it should be 
seen as sociology or politics.”). 
 170.  See Pip Nicholson with Simon Pitt, Official Discourses and Court-Oriented Legal Reform in 
Vietnam, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE GLOBAL DISCOURSES OF LEGAL TRANSFERS 202, 204 
(John Gillespie & Pip Nicholson eds., 2012) (observing that viewing legal reform as mere technical 
assistance obscures the moral dimension of the reform). 
 171.  For example, in Vietnam, donor-funded, court-oriented legal reform that is ideologically 
motivated has poor prospects of success where it challenges the Vietnamese leadership’s ideology.  See 
Nicholson with Pitt, supra note 170, at 235–36 (describing the Vietnamese government’s control of 
reform); see also Rolf Knieper, Pulls and Pushes of Legal Reform in Post-Communist States, 2 HAGUE 
J. ON RULE L. 111, 125–26 (2010) (arguing that the export of the common law is doomed if it has 
neither roots nor local support and rejecting the legal origins thesis). 
 172.  See supra note 132. 
 173.  Peter P. Houtzager, “We Make the Law and the Law Makes Us”: Some Ideas on a Law in 
Development Research Agenda, 32 IDS BULL. 8, 14–15 (2001) (questioning how much law actually 
matters in the complexities of larger social outcomes and individual decision-making). 
 174.  In Cambodia and Vietnam, for instance, local stakeholders involved in court-oriented legal 
reform declared that timelines imposed by donor agencies are unrealistic and too often damaging.  
Nicholson & Low, supra note 167, at 5. 
 175.  Channell, supra note 146, at 141–42; see also ANTONY ALLOTT, THE LIMITS OF LAW 175 
(1980) (complaining about impatient policymakers in developing countries who seek to create large 
VAN ROOIJ AND NICHOLSON MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2014  3:27 PM 
328 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:297 
development also suffers from internal problems related to donor 
bureaucracy.176  Pressure to spend money, the ongoing use of best practice 
models, demands for accountability, and the inherent complexity of legal 
reform in different settings have led to weak project preparation and the 
limited usage of existing knowledge and research.177  All of this is 
exacerbated by weak evaluations of (and thus weak information about) the 
reforms that work and that do not and by the inability to translate lessons 
from failure into improvement for the future.178 
High ambitions have set Rule of Law projects up for failure, as they 
are not matched to available means and to practical, political, and temporal 
constraints.  It appears logical, given the increasing attention on impact, 
that the field move toward more realistic goals that can be defended, 
achieved, and evaluated.  But this has not happened.  On the contrary, the 
field has added further layers of ambition through the Bottom-Up Justice, 
Customary Justice, State-Building, and Transitional Justice paradigms. 
C. Evaluating Bottom-Up and Customary Justice 
The impact of Bottom-Up and Customary Justice projects has not 
escaped scrutiny either.  Compared to all other paradigms discussed, 
however, such attention has been mostly in the form of internal evaluation 
rather than scholarly analysis.179 
Evaluative studies have identified a number of positive impacts of 
Bottom-Up projects.180  Several studies have found that interventions under 
 
social changes through programmatic usage of law). 
 176.  See Carothers, supra note 142, at 25–27 (noting that rule of law aid, despite existing for more 
than 30 years, still suffers from an acute lack of insight that has been perpetuated by aid organizations); 
Golub, supra note 42, at 128–31 (noting that “bureaucratic inertia” produces a lack of imagination and 
responsiveness to local needs and that donor structures produce biases, inflexible budgetary processes, 
lack of informed decision-making, and sectoral compartmentalization); Erik G. Jensen, The Rule of Law 
and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy of Diverse Institutional Patterns and Reformers’ 
Responses, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW, supra 
note 16, at 336, 350 (noting that lender incentives to loan as much money as possible leads them to lend 
to incompetent or corrupt countries where the aid is used less effectively). 
 177.  Channell, supra note 146, at 150–57. 
 178.  See id. at 154–56 (detailing the disincentives for carrying out thorough evaluations and 
learning from them). 
 179.  But see, e.g., Jayasuriya, supra note 159, at 157–58; Doug J. Porter, Some Implications of the 
Application of Legal Pluralism to Development Practice, in LEGAL PLURALISM AND DEVELOPMENT: 
SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS IN DIALOGUE, supra note 159, at 162, 172 (both arguing that the 
dynamic of customary justice projects might be analyzed through a regulatory lens). 
 180.  A collection of studies organized by the International Institute for Environment and 
Development and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization found positive results in 
typical bottom-up interventions involving paralegals, legal literacy, public interest litigation, legal 
clinics, and rights information centers.  Rita H. Aciro-Lakor, Land Rights Information Centres in 
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these paradigms have improved legal knowledge, economic well-being, 
gender equality, land tenure security, and participation.181  A study of a 
USAID-sponsored community court program in Bolivia by a former 
USAID executive noticed greater legal awareness and success in 
“addressing the legal needs of marginalized populations.”182  A study of 
three projects funded by the World Bank Justice for the Poor program 
found that the development of “peace communities” in northern Kenya has 
become a popular and successful way to “define ground rules between 
different local [justice] systems.”183  It also found that labor arbitration 
courts have steadily increased their case loads and have managed “to find 
for the most part, workable resolutions minimally acceptable to all parties” 
(especially impressive given the difficult local political context).184  A 
UNDP-commissioned assessment of a project on legal empowerment 
 
Uganda, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN 
AFRICA, supra note 46, at 71, 72; Boubacar Ba, Paralegals as Agents of Legal Empowerment in the 
Bankass Area of Mali, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND 
RIGHTS IN AFRICA, supra note 46, at 45, 46; Lilian Laurin Barros, Legal Clinics and Participatory Law-
Making for Indigenous Peoples in the Republic of Congo, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: 
USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA, supra note 46, at 119, 120–21; Yahya Kane, 
Legal Literacy Training in the Thiès Region of Senegal, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: USING 
LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA, supra note 46, at 83, 84; Simeon Koroma, 
Paralegals and Community Oversight Boards in Sierra Leone, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: 
USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA, supra note 46, at 77, 78–79; Ednah 
Mndeme, Awareness-Raising and Public Interest Litigation for Mining Communities in Tanzania, in 
LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN AFRICA, supra 
note 46, at 93, 95–96.  They conclude that these interventions have improved land tenure security in 
certain customary law settings.  Aciro-Lakor, supra, at 74; Ba, supra, at 56–58; Barros, supra, at 122; 
Kane, supra, at 88; Koroma, supra, at 77; Mndeme, supra, at 96. 
 181.  See Aciro-Lakor, supra note 180, at 74; Ba, supra note 180, at 58; Barros, supra note 180, at 
122; Koroma, supra note 180, at 82. 
 182.  Tiernan Mennen, The Mystery of Legal Empowerment: Livelihoods and Community Justice in 
Bolivia, in LEGAL EMPOWERMENT: PRACTITIONERS’ PERSPECTIVES 63, 70, 73 (Int’l Dev. Law Org., 
Legal and Governance Reform: Lessons Learned No. 2, Stephen Golub ed., 2010), available at 
http://www.idlo.org/Documents/Legal_Empowerment_Practitioners_Perspectives_Book.pdf. 
 183.  Caroline Sage et al., Taking the Rules of the Game Seriously: Mainstreaming Justice in 
Development: The World Bank’s Justice for the Poor Program 8 (World Bank Justice Reform Practice 
Grp., Justice & Development Working Paper No. 51845, 2009), available at http://a4id.org/sites/ 
default/files/Taking%20the%20Rules%20of%20the%20Game%20Seriously%20-%20Mainstreaming 
%20Justice%20in%20Development.pdf. 
 184.  Id. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The co-founder and co-director of a World 
Bank-funded paralegal program in Sierra Leone declared that the Bank’s Justice for the Poor programs 
in Ecuador and Sierra Leone, and specifically the legal aid and paralegal projects, had a positive impact.  
Maru, supra note 156, at 265–67 (describing the “impressive rates of case resolution” in Ecuador as “a 
startling success,” claiming that the “respondents [in Sierra Leone] were overwhelmingly positive 
[about their experiences with the paralegals],” and praising the “effectiveness [of the paralegals] in 
resolving difficult disputes” and the “strong evidence that [the paralegal organization was] indeed 
empowering [its] clients, the paralegals themselves, and the community as a whole to claim their rights 
and pursue cases that had previously stagnated”). 
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through community radio noted that “[t]he project heightened awareness of 
rights and helped reduce tolerance of injustice” and concluded that “this 
experimental project has been a success worthy of replication and, 
importantly, of continuing support, with a possible view to incorporation 
into the UNDP agenda.”185 
Customary Justice initiatives appear to have had positive impacts as 
well.  A UNDP-commissioned study about worldwide Customary Justice 
interventions, such as legal awareness training through literacy courses, 
information groups, education campaigns, the publication of guidebooks on 
state and non-state laws, and traveling street theatre found that these have 
helped improve the position of vulnerable groups and have provided entry 
points for human rights in Bangladesh, Malawi, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, 
and Cambodia.186  It further concluded that paralegals, lawyers’ networks, 
dispute clearinghouses and resolution panels, and ADR training have all 
improved legal aid in Sierra Leone, Thailand, East Timor, Puerto Rico, and 
Cambodia.187  It noted finally that capacity development for informal 
justice actors in the areas of mediation and citizens’ rights works 
reasonably well in Burundi, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Rwanda, and 
Bangladesh.188 
Customary Justice interventions face limits and challenges, however.  
Interventions are constrained by a number of factors, including a lack of 
paralegal capacity,189 resistant local elites who fear a subversion of their 
power base,190 donor dependency and a lack of sustainability,191 a lack of 
confidence and trust in the community,192 and “cut-throat antagonism” 
between weak and poor communities and powerful outside investors.193  
Additionally, limited numbers of representatives in newly established local 
organizations restrict the potential impact of such organizations.194  
Interventions also face difficulty training lay persons as paralegals, a 
 
 185.  USHA RAMANATHAN, THE ASIA-PACIFIC RIGHTS AND JUSTICE INITIATIVE: INDIA COUNTRY 
ASSESSMENT 7–8 (Andrea Davis ed., 2009), available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/ 
publication/en/publications/democratic-governance/dgttf-/india-country-assessment-the-asia-pacific-
rights-and-justice-initiative/IndiaA2JCountryAssessment.pdf. 
 186.  WOJKOWSKA, supra note 67, at 33–34. 
 187.  Id. at 35–36. 
 188.  Id. at 38–39. 
 189.  Ba, supra note 180, at 50–58. 
 190.  Aciro-Lakor, supra note 180, at 75; Ba, supra note 180, at 58–59. 
 191.  Aciro-Lakor, supra note 180, at 71–77; Kane, supra note 180, at 90; Mndeme, supra note 
180, at 97. 
 192.  Barros, supra note 180, at 122; Mndeme, supra note 180, at 97. 
 193.  Mndeme, supra note 180, at 97. 
 194.  Sage et al., supra note 183, at 14. 
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prevalence of ceremony over capacity, gender quotas for adjudicators that 
undermine community cohesion, dissatisfaction among disputing parties 
over emphases on reconciliation, the perpetuation of the absence of formal 
institutions as informal dispute mechanisms are strengthened, and a lack of 
sustainability and local legitimacy.195  Overall community progress has 
hinged much more on local sociopolitical factors, including the perceived 
external threat to local tenure security, leader capacities, group cohesion, 
and ongoing land conflicts.196 
Challenges of scale exist also, as projects have hardly ever moved 
beyond small pilots.  Scaling projects up to cover whole regions, especially 
when trying to do so sustainably and while maintaining independence from 
the government, is fraught with issues.197  The UNDP’s Access to Justice 
program in Cambodia only accomplished half of its goals—and even those 
took longer than expected—leaving its sustainability uncertain.198  The 
program’s positive impact “remains limited as the communes/districts 
covered by the project are few in relation to the national territory.”199  The 
concept of legal empowerment as operationalized by the now-defunct 
Commission for Legal Empowerment for the Poor (CLEP) has been 
strongly criticized for overambition, inconsistencies in its conceptual 
framework of legal empowerment, an excessive focus on theories of legal 
exclusion, a failure to incorporate other factors responsible for injustice and 
poverty, inadequate attention to gender issues, applying a top-down 
approach even while advocating a bottom-up approach, and insufficient 
attention to the inherent political and power issues at play.200 
 
 195.  WOJKOWSKA, supra note 67, at 35, 38–39. 
 196.  Rachael Knight, The Community Land Titling Initiative: An Investigation into Best Practices 
for the Protection of Customary Land Claims, in WORKING WITH CUSTOMARY JUSTICE SYSTEMS: 
POST-CONFLICT AND FRAGILE STATES 145, 162 (Erica Harper ed., 2011). 
 197.  Maru, supra note 156, at 269–70. 
 198.  VELIBOR POPOVIĆ, THE ASIA-PACIFIC RIGHTS AND JUSTICE INITIATIVE: CAMBODIA 
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT 7 (Andrea Davis ed., 2009). 
 199.  Id. at 13. 
 200.  Dan Banik, Legal Empowerment as a Conceptual and Operational Tool in Poverty 
Eradication, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 117, 121–26 (2009) (criticizing the claimed linkages between the 
legal empowerment approach and both democracy and human rights for being not sufficiently validated 
and for weakening the conceptual underpinnings of the legal empowerment approach and faulting 
CLEP for failing to address a variety of legal issues that are important to poverty reduction, including 
education, violence against women, inequality, and social exclusion); Julio Faundez, Empowering 
Workers in the Informal Economy, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 156, 171–72 (2009) (arguing that a Peruvian 
case study reveals that legally empowering those in the informal economy requires ecomomic, social 
and political strategies as well as legal reform); Matthew Stephens, The Commission on Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor: A Opportunity Missed, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 132, 134 (2009) (noting that 
one of the fundamental gaps in CLEP’s work is its failure to address the challenges of policy and 
institutional change required to empower the poor despite its unique position). 
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There are several issues that require clarification before the legal 
community concludes that these projects have the impact sought and that 
they succeed where Rule of Law has failed.  First is the definition of 
impact.  Most of the studies discussed here have looked at the immediate 
impact of particular problems found in the local communities where a 
project was implemented.  Scholars should instead ask whether individual 
impacts cumulatively result in a broader impact on empowerment, access to 
justice, minority rights protection, and capital integration.  Impact can be 
understood in terms of its achievements or in the manner in which they 
were obtained.  While the Bottom-up and Customary Justice paradigms 
stress a bottom-up approach based on local knowledge, the similarities in 
the approaches that have been tried across the world in different programs 
with diverse donors demonstrate that a top-down approach remains 
influential. 
Second is the scale and sustainability of these programs.  Most 
projects studied are relatively small-scale and pilot-like, and yet it is often 
assumed that their positive impacts can be a basis for broader interventions 
that cover larger areas for longer periods of time.  Additionally, it is not 
clear whether the projects would have succeeded without significant donor 
support and a narrow geographical focus, that the success can be sustained 
without the donor, or that the project can be transplanted through a best 
practice-type approach. 
Thirdly, there is a risk of concluding that projects achieved positive 
outcomes on the basis of the impacts of those projects.  Measuring the 
impacts of Bottom-Up and Customary Justice interventions is highly 
challenging, as it requires establishing causality between a multitude of 
interventions and a variety of complex outcomes (empowerment, 
awareness, access to capital, etc.).201  Few of the studies detail their 
research methods,202 and even they merely state that surveys were used or 
provide no details on what type of data on outputs and impact was gathered 
 
 201.  See Sumaiya Khair, Evaluating Legal Empowerment: Problems of Analysis and 
Measurement, 1 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 33, 36 (2009) (“It is indeed difficult to establish a causal link 
between specific legal actions and the resultant legal actions and the resultant development.  One of the 
fundamental problems in assessing legal empowerment is that the characteristics and conduct that typify 
empowerment in one context may well have different implications in another.”); see also ADAM L. 
MASSER, MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGIES FOR LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR (United Nations 
Dev. Programme, Discussion Paper No. 6, 2009), available at http://gaportal.org/sites/default/files/ 
Measurement-Methodologies-for-Legal-Empowerement-of-the-Poor.pdf (addressing issues surrounding 
the methodology of measuring legal empowerment). 
 202.  But see Knight, supra note 196, at 157–58 (providing a clear methodology and comparison of 
groups at different levels of the intervention). 
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or the methods used to gather it.203  Most studies merely describe the 
context and aims of a project and then discuss its results and challenges, 
only occasionally mentioning its failures.204  This framing almost 
automatically leads to a positive portrayal of the intervention as the best 
way to solve a particular problem.205  Some studies risk portraying 
initiatives as successes simply by describing their achieved outputs206 or 
even worse by simply restating the aims that they sought to address.207  
Few studies systematically analyze in detail which conditions explain their 
positive or negative outcomes.  Finally, and perhaps most worrisome, most 
impact studies discussed here were carried out by the people directly 
responsible for the conceptualization, funding, or execution of the project.  
While these studies were of course done in as objective of a manner as 
possible, a positive bias may nonetheless have arisen.208  To fully ascertain 
the data presented, more study by independent scholars is necessary. 
Some of the studies propose remedies to deal with the projects’ 
limitations.  Several are reiterations of the original bottom-up paradigm.209  
Some call for more research, a deeper empirical understanding of both 
 
 203.  See e.g., ERICA HARPER, CUSTOMARY JUSTICE: FROM PROGRAM DESIGN TO IMPACT 
EVALUATION (2011), available at http://www.idlo.org/Publications/CustomaryJustice1.pdf; 
WOJKOWSKA, supra note 67. 
 204.  See e.g., Aciro-Lakor, supra note 180, at 74–75; Ba, supra note 180, at 59–60; Kane, supra 
note 180, at 88–91; Mndeme, supra note 180, at 96–97. 
 205.  See, e.g., HARPER, supra note 203 (providing one of the broadest overviews of how to 
improve customary justice systems and summarizing what should be done under certain circumstances).  
While this study does list the challenges of the possible interventions, it ends each section only with an 
overview of “entry points” and “good practices,” without a clear summary of what should or should not 
be done under particular conditions.  See id. at 52–55, 75–80, 90–95. 
 206.  See, e.g., Mennen, supra note 182, at 9–13 (compiling plenty of data about activities and 
issues but leaving implicit the nexus between the program and the goal of enhancing access to justice 
for the poor).  See Cohen et al., supra note 121, at 108 for further discussion of this problem. 
 207.  See, e.g., ANA PATRICIA GRAÇA, THE ASIA PACIFIC RIGHTS AND JUSTICE INITIATIVE: 
REGIONAL ASSESSMENT 24 (Andrea Davis ed., 2009), available at http://www.undp.org/content/dam/ 
aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-governance/dgttf-/regional-assessment-the-asia-pacific-
rights-and-justice-initiative/UNDPRegionalBookfinal.pdf; Sage et al., supra note 183, at 15 (reiterating 
principles and lessons rather than evaluating what works and what does not based on existing data). 
 208.  See Channell, supra note 146, at 154 (“Reports are written primarily by people who are paid 
by those who receive the reports.  The writer’s job is to provide information in such a way as to meet 
the client’s expectations.  One of those expectations is implementation success that will justify ongoing 
or new funding. . . .  Thus, there are few reports detailing mistakes or failures.  Where they exist, 
implementers know how to describe them as successes.”). 
 209.  See, e.g., GRAÇA, supra note 207, at 41, 48 (maintaining that “ownership is necessary” and 
that reformers should “forge closer links between traditional and formal justice”); Maru, supra note 
156, at 280 (suggesting that reformers “be attentive to particularities of sociolegal context” and that 
“reforms have a greater chance of success when they grow out of local initiative”); Sage et al., supra 
note 183, at 16–17 (discussing “institutional reform as an ‘interim process’” and advocating “deep 
engagement with local contexts”). 
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interventions and their contexts,210 and better and more independent 
evaluations.211  Some studies concurrently advocate a combined bottom-up 
and broader state-centered strategy under the Rule of Law paradigm, 
stating that the two cannot be unlinked.212 
When these recommendations are read together with the challenges 
listed in the Bottom-Up and Customary Justice literature, the ambition of 
these paradigms in practice is evident.  How can Bottom-Up and 
Customary Justice paradigms operate together with the Rule of Law 
paradigm in a bottom-up manner?  Furthermore, how can it be alleged that 
there will be broader impacts beyond pilot projects, with more resources 
invested in research and evaluation?  And finally, how does any of this 
overcome structural resistance from local power asymmetries and lack of 
local support and capacity? 
D. Questions About Post-Conflict State-Building 
Rule of law promotion in the context of post-conflict state-building 
has elicited many critical questions.213  Many of the problems mentioned in 
the literature on justice programs in the context of state-building resemble 
issues discussed by rule of law critics more generally.  First is a lack of 
local knowledge and a mismatch between program goals and local 
conditions.214  The lack of local knowledge in these types of foreign-
 
 210.  See, e.g., ASIAN DEV. BANK, supra note 58, at 24 (noting the shortage of rigorous evaluation 
and research that can inform legal empowerment strategies and activities and of related efforts in such 
fields as governance and rule of law); id. at 124 (stressing the need to work with local experts to 
identify legal empowerment issues and constraints in a given country or working context); Maru, supra 
note 156, at 278-279 (reviewing calls by different experts in the field for more in-depth and 
sophisticated research); Sage et al., supra note 183, at 17–18 (arguing that governance and justice work 
should rely less on “tool kits” and “best practices” and more on local research capacity and highlighting 
the importance of deep engagement with local context to avoid the “common risk of importing 
assumptions about what should be, or jumping to an idealized end product”). 
 211.  See, e.g., GRAÇA, supra note 207, at 47. 
 212.  See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, ACCELERATING ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: A UNDP RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE 1 (2010), available at http://www.unrol. 
org/files/RoL-A2J%20GP%20Annual%20Report%202010%20DGG%20BDP.pdf (integrating rule of 
law building with access to justice). 
 213.  See, e.g., Bruce Baker & Eric Scheye, Access to Justice in a Post-conflict State: Donor-
Supported Multidimensional Peacekeeping in Southern Sudan, 16 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 171, 177 
(2009) (“However assessed, it is clear that a state-centric justice system will take more than a 
generation to establish and even then will, most likely, be unsustainable.  There is also little likelihood 
that the state system will provide much safety and justice to most southern Sudanese of the current 
generation.”). 
 214.  See, e.g., Bâli, supra note 94, at 445 (stating that the American-backed rule of law projects 
“have relied on best practices compilations and a hodge-podge of local customs and traditions . . . .  
Patched together from a number of other contexts, but fundamentally informed by a conception of 
political and legal institutions appropriate for a Western-style liberal democracy, these projects have 
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dominated justice projects in post-conflict situations is similar to (but more 
extreme than) that in average law and development projects carried out in 
more stable contexts.  The post-conflict context draws a particular type of 
foreign expert, who, because of the lower pay, higher risk, and shorter 
contracts, is more junior and has only a small amount of narrow work 
experience but who must face an often complex local situation, having very 
limited local knowledge and insufficient time to gain any, and operating in 
relative social seclusion.215 
Second, echoing the Rule of Law critics, post-conflict justice sector 
reforms are too focused on building state institutions and pay insufficient 
attention to whether these are accessible and meet societal needs and to 
existing alternative non-state systems.216  Citizens in post-conflict 
situations may deeply distrust police institutions and have trouble accessing 
newly constructed state courts (because of distance, cost, and 
unfamiliarity).217  Consequently most citizens do not go to the police or 
state courts and resort to local, non-state forms of police and dispute 
management.218  Thus, citizens do not necessarily need state-delivered 
justice; they might prefer improved local systems to expensive and 
inaccessible state systems.219 
There are, however, also problems that are particular to the 
challenging conditions of post-conflict countries.  First is a lack of basic 
security, which is a vital precondition for the functioning of justice 
institutions.220  When public insecurity is pervasive, it is very difficult to 
develop respect for the law, let alone a law that has only recently been 
established by a foreign occupying power seen as responsible for the 
insecurity.221  Additionally, especially in countries that have experienced 
long-term conflict and that have a fragile state government, there is very 
little capacity to staff the newly established justice institutions.222  Apart 
 
little lasting impact or success in the local contexts in which they have operated.”). 
 215.  Elena Baylis, Tribunal-Hopping with the Post-conflict Justice Junkies, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 
361, 364–65, 373–76, 383–84, 386 (2008). 
 216.  See, e.g., Baker & Scheye, supra note 213, at 171 (questioning assumptions about the need 
and acceptability of post-conflict rebuilding of the justice sector). 
 217.  Id. at 177–79 (detailing how Southern Sudan citizens have deep distrust for the police and see 
little use for courts). 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  See Chesterman, supra note 99, at 83 (detailing the difficulties of administering justice in a 
challenging security environment). 
 221.  Bâli, supra note 94, at 445. 
 222.  See, e.g., Baker & Scheye, supra note 213, at 177 (depicting the problems faced by the 
development experts in Southern Sudan when judges could not communicate in English and proved to 
be trained predominantly in Sharia law); Chesterman, supra note 99, at 84–86 (discussing the difficulty 
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from human resources, rule of law efforts in post-conflict conditions are 
hampered by a lack of basic infrastructure and financial resources, as 
justice institutions often lack offices, phones, and sufficient salaries.223  
This leads to widely asked questions about the sustainability of justice 
reforms, especially when donor funds dry up.224  Additionally, there are 
problems associated with competing donor agendas and with a lack of 
coordination—between agencies involved with police and those involved 
with the courts, for example—that are further exacerbated by the post-
conflict context.225 
Perhaps the trickiest and most important problem is legitimacy, which 
is particularly difficult to achieve during a foreign occupation following a 
war initiated by one of the occupiers, more so if the war was preventive.  
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq is a recent example of this.226  Many believe 
that the occupation was illegal under international law and thus lacked 
international and local legitimacy.227  Nor was there a clear mandate under 
international law to build a nation and to introduce market liberalization as 
the United States has done.228  Additionally, some argue that the United 
States took the wrong course of action in Iraq by dismantling the country’s 
main state institutions during the first 13 months of occupation, which 
created widespread insecurity.229  Such problems of legitimacy are 
 
of finding suitable judges in Timor-Leste after the UN tried to follow a locally-oriented approach to rule 
of law building). 
 223.  Baker & Scheye, supra note 213, at 171–72, 176; Chesterman, supra note 99, at 86. 
 224.  Baker & Scheye, supra note 213, at 176. 
 225.  Banks, supra note 107, at 161–65. 
 226.  Bâli, supra note 94, at 438 (“Having razed much of Iraq’s state infrastructure to the ground 
through bombing campaigns and de-Baathification purges, the U.S. occupation authority may not be 
regarded by most Iraqis as a benevolent power to which they are able to transfer the loyalty and 
commitment that would be required to instill a new political culture in Iraq.”). 
 227.  Bâli, supra note 94, at 466 (“[T]he invasion and occupation of Iraq are widely seen as illegal 
under international law. . . .  [T]he United States has consistently ignored the international law of 
belligerent occupation . . . . [which] requires an occupying power to retain the status quo with respect to 
the legal and political system of the occupied territory, except where modifications are strictly 
necessary for reasons of security. . . . [T]he Bush administration made it clear from the outset that these 
requirements would not be observed and that an interim constitution would be put in place, designed 
precisely to transform the Iraqi legal and political system.”). 
 228.  Id. at 439, 441 (“[T]he establishment of a market economy takes the U.S. reconstruction 
strategy in Iraq well beyond any internationally recognized legal authority.”). 
 229.  See id. at 435 (characterizing the U.S. strategy as having “[w]asted the potential political 
capital of legitimacy that the United States (and the transitional Iraqi authorities) had initially enjoyed 
after the fall of the Baath regime, and [having] squandered a valuable opportunity to lay institutional 
foundations for the rule of law in Iraq.”).  This echoes insights from UN missions in Kosovo and East 
Timor.  See Hansjörg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United 
Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 60 (2001) (“The United Nations’ 
most recent experiences in transitional administration demonstrate that justice, and law enforcement 
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compounded if the occupying force seeking to build rule of law exempts 
itself from the new law’s jurisdiction.  For instance, during the occupation, 
the United States afforded impunity to its military and civilian personal, 
undermining its own nascent rule of law efforts on the ground.230  All of 
this raises the question of whether the rule of law can be created under 
occupation, especially given the difficulty of developing respect for a law 
that lacks legitimacy.231 
As with the rule of law, the ultimate problem of limited impact may be 
the high level of ambition of post-conflict state-building.  Establishing the 
rule of law in the name of building a nation and a national identity in post-
conflict situations is an unfeasible goal that requires long term 
“incremental, indigenous, socio-political” processes that, “if at all feasible, 
will have to be undertaken autonomously.”232 
Some authors have sought recommendations on how to deal with the 
many disappointments regarding the impact of post-conflict justice 
programs.  A key recommendation is to combine state-centered rule of law 
building with efforts to engage with local systems and notions of justice 
still existent in fragile states.233  The state could serve as a regulator of the 
parameters of justice and ensure the accountability of all justice 
institutions.234  In addition, reforms would enhance “the voice of the users 
and recipients of justice and security services to enable them to be 
participants in the delivery of the service they receive.”235  This approach, 
 
more broadly, must be seen as effective from the first days of an operation.  The inability to react 
swiftly to crime and public unrest, particularly in postconflict situations when criminal activity tends to 
increase, and the failure to detain and convict suspected criminals promptly and fairly, can quickly 
erode the public’s confidence in the United Nations.”). 
 230.  Bâli, supra note 94, at 467–68. 
 231.  Bâli, supra note 94, at 448; see also Chandler, supra note 93, at 577 (challenging, in the 
context of UN rule of law efforts in Bosnia, the idea that “the ‘rule of law’ can be imposed from 
outside,” finding that external pressure is undermined by limited legitimacy); id. at 580 (questioning the 
international consensus for establishing the rule of law before establishing political processes and 
contending that such an approach inherently creates a rule of law that is external to the local politics and 
thus without legitimacy and impact). 
 232.  Bâli, supra note 94, at 436–37 (“The ambition and breadth of such projects, frequently 
undertaken in the name of such laudable goals as democratization and liberalization, lie at the root of 
their failure.”). 
 233.  See, e.g., Baker & Scheye, supra note 213, at 182 (“A positive step would be for the donor-
supported multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations to look beyond its traditional western ‘state-
building’ model . . . and actively support local justice networks . . . .  Such a move would not diminish 
the role and function of the state . . . .”); Bâli, supra note 94, at 448 (contending that rule of law in post-
conflict regions should build on local legal traditions, taking examples from the Arab world in the case 
of Iraq). 
 234.  Baker & Scheye, supra note 213, at 182. 
 235.  Id. 
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however, replicates the agenda of powerful colonialists, whereby soft or 
indirect support for legal change was used to foster demand for formal 
institutions that replicated those of the colonial administration.236 
So here again, in response to the criticism of existing practices, highly 
thoughtful recommendations have been made that increase the level of 
ambition.  Not only must law and development build state legal institutions 
in the most difficult of circumstances, but it must do so in a bottom-up 
manner and while enabling local justice providers. 
E. Transitional Justice Challenges 
The practice and impact of transitional justice has also received much 
scholarly attention.  Most critics call for a more comprehensive approach to 
transitional justice that would clearly only enhance the level of ambition. 
Some positive impacts have been reported.  One empirical 
comparative study, using a database of transitional justice processes drawn 
from 150 countries over thirty years, measured the impact of three types of 
transitional justice: amnesties; prosecutions; and truth commissions on 
democratization, rule of law building, and ending violence.237  The findings 
show that any transitional justice mechanism improves democracy more 
than none at all but that only trials and prosecutions have a positive impact 
on rule of law development.238  Claims by advocates that transitional justice 
responses lead to peace and reconciliation appear at this point to represent 
hopes for a happy ending and not evidence-based politics on which the 
international community can count.239 
Most other studies question whether transitional justice has the desired 
impact and can meet its broad goals.240  Some have even found that some 
forms of transitional justice, especially amnesties, have a negative 
 
 236.  See Jayasuriya, supra note 159, at 158 (noting that support of customary law can risk 
“authoritarian possibilities” given their vulnerability to manipulation by colonialists and reformers 
alike); see also Porter, supra note 179, at 168–71 (noting that there can be an insidious use of legal 
pluralism by the “reformer” to manufacture calls for the reform that the reformer wishes to inject or 
effect). 
 237.  See Tricia D. Olsen et al., Does Transitional Justice Work? Latin America in Comparative 
Perspective, GLOBAL STUD. REV., Fall 2009, http://www.globality-gmu.net/archives/1789. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  See, e.g., Laurel E. Fletcher et al., Context, Timing and the Dynamics of Transitional Justice: 
A Historical Perspective, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 163, 168–69 (2009) (“[T]here is little empirical data to 
support the common assumptions that underlie the utility either of criminal trials for alleged 
perpetrators or truth and truth/reconciliation commissions.”); Olsen et al., supra note 237 (summarizing 
data that indicates that singular post-conflict mechanisms do not work well and that only holistic 
approaches are effective for ensuring democracy and human right protection). 
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impact,241 as they create popular dissatisfaction and anger when those 
responsible for past atrocities are not held legally accountable or when they 
receive only relatively minor punishments.242  Transitional justice processes 
that focus on restoration without delivering retribution cannot get popular 
support from victims,243 who complain that their own trouble making ends 
meet stands in stark contrast with the lavish amounts of money spent on 
trials and perpetrators.244  Victims often care more for their own pressing 
socioeconomic needs, partly made worse by the impact of the atrocities, 
and thus for restitutive justice.245  Sierra Leone interviewees “perceived 
excombatants as being in a better position to earn a living than amputees, 
who in many cases do not have shelter, let alone jobs and a means of 
meeting their basic needs.”246  Victims’ geographical remoteness further 
undermines legitimacy, as victims are unable to attend trials or commission 
hearings, which are often held in major cities or even abroad.247  Thus, 
transitional institutions’ key goal to counter the denial of past atrocities 
may be undermined, especially where the institutions lack broad 
legitimacy.248 
Another key legitimacy issue is the unbalanced geopolitical nature of 
transitional justice interventions, which have predominantly focused on 
non-democratic states in the global south, with only limited attention to 
gross human rights violations in democratic Western contexts, such as the 
treatment of indigenous populations in Australia, Canada, and the United 
States.249  Legitimate transitional justice seems extra difficult in the context 
 
 241.  Olsen et al., supra note 237. 
 242.  See Lambourne, supra note 110, at 37–38 (interviewing individuals in Timor-Leste, Rwanda, 
and Cambodia and finding, for example, that the people of Cambodia petitioned the UN to establish an 
international tribunal). 
 243.  Id. at 38. 
 244.  Id. at 42 (“[A Cambodian] genocide survivor asked, ‘Why should the former Khmer Rouge 
live so freely and be received . . . in a five-star hotel?  This makes a lot of people angry.’”). 
 245.  Id. (“[T]he Tribunal was seen as not responding to the material needs of victims and 
witnesses (providing no compensation, restitution, healthcare or other financial assistance).”). 
 246.  Id. at 43. 
 247.  See id. at 40 (describing the remote location of the ICTR and the inability for most Rwandan 
victims and survivors to experience the proceedings). 
 248.  Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice, 30 HUM. RTS. Q. 
95, 108 (2008) (“Where the legitimacy of transitional justice institutions is successfully challenged, this 
undermines their impact in addressing denial [of past atrocities].”); see also Jamie Rowen, Social 
Reality and Philosophical Ideals in Transitional Justice, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 93, 
116 (2008) (noting that policymakers could fulfill a goal of transitional justice and reach more 
individuals by creating and contributing to the community). 
 249.  See Rosemary Nagy, Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections, 29 THIRD 
WORLD Q. 275, 280–81 (noting that, in Western democracies, there are also prevalent instances of 
systematic human rights abuses in which justice has been long denied and pointing out that by focusing 
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of foreign occupation.250  The United States-organized trial for former Iraqi 
president Saddam Hussein is a prime example.251  Problems included 
Hussein being denied access to a defense attorney during the first year of 
the trial, the murder of three defense attorneys during the trial, and the 
forced resignation of a biased judge.252  Furthermore, the trial was 
organized at an undisclosed location at a U.S. military base on Iraqi soil, 
with unidentified judges, and the defendant was held incommunicado for 
months prior to trial, with no public access and limited access for 
journalists.253  The trial raises the question of whether “justice” is even 
possible in the context of illegitimate and unjustified occupation.254 
Meanwhile, many scholars criticize existing transitional justice 
practices for not going far enough, arguing that trials, truth commissions, 
and amnesties often fail to address the underlying socioeconomic and 
cultural causes of conflict and the broader grievances that citizens suffer in 
the post-conflict area.255  Scholars claim, for instance, that transitional 
justice ignores the impact of conflict and of mass human rights violations 
on developmental inequalities and that existing inequalities continue or are 
made worse, even following a transitional justice intervention.256  This has 
led many transitional justice reforms “to underrate the gendered and 
socioeconomic ramifications of violent conflict” and to be “heavily 
influenced by the international legalist paradigm, which focuses on 
generating elite and mass compliance with international humanitarian 
 
on non-Western developing countries, transitional justice “is vulnerable to the general challenge that 
critics raise against the supposed universalism of human rights”). 
 250.  See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Post-conflict Justice in Iraq: An Appraisal of the Iraq Special 
Tribunal, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 327, 359 (2005) (“No norm or precedents exist in international law for 
an occupying power, the legitimacy of which is in doubt, to establish an exceptional national criminal 
tribunal.”). 
 251.  See Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, Iraq: Amnesty International Deplores Death Sentences in 
Saddam Hussein Trial (Nov. 5, 2006) (quoting Malcolm Smart), available at http://www.amnesty.org/ 
en/library/asset/MDE14/037/2006/en/0292f7f1-f9d1-11dd-b1b0-c961f7df9c35/mde140372006en.pdf 
(“[Saddam Hussein’s] overthrow opened the opportunity to restore this basic right [to a fair trial] and, at 
the same time, to ensure, fairly, accountability for the crimes of the past.  It is an opportunity missed . . . 
and made worse by the imposition of the death penalty.”); Bâli, supra note 94, at 432–33 (“[T]he 
absence of certain procedural protections and the imposition of the death penalty may undermine 
transitional justice in Iraq.”). 
 252.  Bâli, supra note 94, at 432–33. 
 253.  Id. at 432. 
 254.  See Nagy, supra note 249, at 279. 
 255.  Id. at 276 (“[P]redominant views [in transitional justice] construct human rights violations 
fairly narrowly to the exclusion of structural and gender–based violence.”). 
 256.  See, e.g., id. at 280; RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS 
OF WAR 151 (2002) (“[T]he prevalent liberal-democratic ideal . . . tends to favour freedom and liberty 
over equality.”). 
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norms.”257 
Scholars also point to the historical nature of most proceedings, which 
pay too little attention to what is happening in the post-conflict era, when 
violence often persists or even increases.258  The position of women and 
children in these post-conflict situations is particularly worrisome.259  A 
fixation on the past also obscures post-conflict justice problems arising 
from foreign occupation, which can be detrimental to the legitimacy of 
transitional justice.260 Justice issues that arise under military occupation 
simply do not fall under the scope of the transitional justice effort, which is 
directed at pre-occupation atrocities.261 
As with other paradigms, scholars also criticize the limited local 
embedment and usage of local knowledge.262  The legal framing 
predominant in transitional justice “at times is detrimentally abstracted 
from lived realities” and invites the implementation of  “one size fits all, 
technocratic and decontexualized solutions” that are “[s]teeped in Western 
liberalism, and often located outside of the area where conflict 
occurred.”263  Any solution proposed in response to such criticism only 
further pushes the level of ambition, just as with the other paradigms.  
Similar to the critics of the Rule of Law and State-Building paradigms, 
scholars call for placing extra priority on an understanding of the local 
context and an adaptation of interventions to it264: for instance, by using 
local courts and local customary justice institutions, which have better 
reach into the local community, instead of international tribunals or 
foreign-influenced and newly established domestic courts.265 
Practitioners and scholars support a broadened concept of transitional 
justice that can, for instance, “integrat[e] social, economic and cultural 
 
 257.  Nagy, supra note 249, at 278 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 258.  See, e.g., id. at 280. 
 259.  See id.; NAHLA VALJI, UNITED NATIONS DEV. FUND FOR WOMEN, A WINDOW OF 
OPPORTUNITY?: MAKING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE WORK FOR WOMEN 2–3 (2010), available at http:// 
international-ul.com/pdf/0701_MakingTransitionalJusticeWorkForWomen_en.pdf (arguing for the need 
to implement a gender-sensitive transitional justice agenda in order to preclude entrenching the 
violation of human rights and perpetuating the marginalization of women). 
 260.  Nagy, supra note 249, at 280. 
 261.  Id. 
 262.  du Plessis & Ford, supra note 111, at 90 (“[E]very country situation is unique, ‘reconciliation’ 
in particular is something that needs to be defined within the specific cultural context, and so a number 
of more general cautions need to be expressed in approaching foreign models and comparative 
experience.”). 
 263.  Nagy, supra note 249, at 275–76 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 264.  See, e.g., Fletcher et al., supra note 240, at 170. 
 265.  See Rowen, supra note 248, at 117. 
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rights.”266  More particularly, there is a call to connect previous experience 
to reform through using, where possible, local practices to shore up 
“accountability, acknowledgement, socioeconomic justice and political 
justice.”267  Such an ambitious approach proposes addressing past abuses, 
while also seeking to cauterize them.268  Techniques invoked include truth 
commissions and war crimes tribunals.269  It is argued that such a integrated 
approach might forestall repeats of violence.270  This goal, aspiring to 
engineer peace and redress, “implies long-term, sustainable processes 
embedded in society and adoption of psychological, political, economic, as 
well as legal, perspectives on justice.”271  These ideals require legal 
processes to engineer peace and harmony. 
If these suggestions are followed, Transitional Justice becomes 
Transformative Justice, based on the broadest notion of social, economic, 
political, and legal transformation following years or decades of gross 
human rights violations, war, state failure, and structural socioeconomic 
inequality.272  Of course, in an ideal world in which law and development 
has omnipotent knowledge, power, and local legitimacy, these ideas would 
form a comprehensive agenda for change that tackles the interrelated 
problems.  In reality, however, the expansion of the already highly 
ambitious transitional justice agenda just does not look feasible and might 
even undermine the original restorative and retributive functions of 
transitional justice institutions.273  Other, down-to-earth voices point out 
that “transitional justice is a long-term process and that a state may only be 
adequately prepared years later to take on the challenge of adjudicating 
trials or exposing wrong-doing through a truth commission.”274 
All of these suggestions mostly point again to a broadening of the 
already overburdened law and development paradigm.275  Just as with Rule 
 
 266.  Duthie, supra note 112, at 303. 
 267.  Lambourne, supra note 110, at 47. 
 268.  See Rama Mani, Editorial, Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the 
Nexus Between Transitional Justice and Development, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 253, 259–60 
(2008). 
 269.  Id. at 258. 
 270.  Lisa J. Laplante, Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and Addressing the 
Socioeconomic Roots of Violence Through a Human Rights Framework, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 
331, 355 (2008). 
 271.  Lambourne, supra note 110, at 28. 
 272.  See id. at 45 (advocating for such a model). 
 273.  Duthie, supra note 112, at 306–07 (“Attempts to address . . . development[] may 
unrealistically raise and then frustrate expectations of victims and society, or they may simply be a 
waste of time and resources.”). 
 274.  Fletcher et al., supra note 240, at 219. 
 275.  But see id. at 170 (stating that one should always first ask “what, whether, and when 
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of Law, Bottom-Up Justice, Customary Justice, and State-Building, critics 
of the impact of the Transitional Justice paradigm seek to improve it by 
broadening its scope and thus paradoxically creating an even higher level 
of ambition. 
CONCLUSION: AMBITION VS. IMPACT 
The consecutive expansion of law and development paradigms has 
produced a field that seeks to establish some of the most ambitious forms 
of social engineering, aiming not only to build a rule of law that can foster 
development but also to change unfavorable local practices that might 
undermine such development, doing so amid ethnic conflict and in failed 
states.  Increasingly, there are questions about and criticism of its ability to 
achieve these lofty goals.  Surprisingly, instead of lowering its ambitions, 
the field has only continued to add to them.  Furthermore, the field 
consistently refuses to engage with the question of whether there is a moral 
rationale for the interference in local regimes by the concerned donor West. 
There is not a simple response to these bedrock questions.  Arguably, 
the answers vary by context and depend on the moral position taken by 
reformers to their initiatives.  The recipients’ demand for and experience of 
aid is consistently underexplored, however, despite the increased 
investment in measuring impacts. 
The criticism that the law and development project is limited in its 
imagination to recasting old approaches and is incapable of moving beyond 
the politics of the West and its interests is not new.276  More recently, some 
have argued that the development strategy of using “soft law” to shape or 
engineer local calls for or responses to legal reforms is reclaiming earlier 
strategies used by colonial masters.277  It is also argued that the current 
conception of Law and Development involves the West constructing and 
using development as a strategy to entrench dependency, although the 
mission exhibits Christian faith-based zeal.278  If these arguments are 
 
transitional justice interventions should be initiated”); Duthie, supra note 112, at 306–07 (warning 
against unfeasible transitional justice interventions, lest they get caught up in the development paradigm 
and in redistribution and socioeconomic rights issues). 
 276.  Upendra Baxi, The Colonialist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND 
TRANSITIONS 46 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003) (arguing that the ways in which 
comparative law has been constructed serve to entrench Western worldviews and interests and noting 
that law and development’s approach to legal reform is not dissimilar to that of myriad colonialists). 
 277.  See Jayasuriya, supra note 159, at 158; Porter, supra note 179, at 168–71. 
 278.  See JENNIFER L. BEARD, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DESIRE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
DEVELOPMENT AND THE NATION STATE (2007) (arguing that the Western notion of development 
derives from early Christian notions of sin, salvation, and redemption and ought not to be assumed to 
emanate from imperialist traditions). 
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accepted, there is no space for law and development other than as a 
Western neo-colonial project. 
Development as a tool of subjugation is also decried by scholars who 
criticize international law as a tool of oppression,279 particularly for its role 
in entrenching global poverty.  In particular, there is a robust criticism of 
international trade norms and practices.280  While there is much rhetoric on 
the importance of consultation and the local ownership of aid,281 the seven 
paradigms outlined above are almost without exception designed by 
outsiders and aspire to see a Western model of law made available to a 
broader community.  The focus on impact has been at the cost of a focus on 
the “demand” side of law and development.282  The politics of aid also 
manufactures and entrenches Western self-interest in the export of legal 
systems similar to those in donor countries.283  This continues despite the 
vulnerability of such exports to criticism arising from the recent global 
financial crisis and despite the perceived shortcomings of the institutional 
legal matrices of the West.284 
 
 279.  See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in 
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J.  1, 1–2 (1999). 
 280.  See, e.g., SARAH JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO?: A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 141–80 
(2011) (arguing that the WTO has entenched poverty in developing states and shows no sign of 
adopting policies that might redress the imbalance of trade power between developed and developing 
states); SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH 
AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY 254–62 (2011) (arguing that decolonization produced the 
developmental nation-state, which has since become bound by Western states invoking international 
law, itself a postcolonial phenomenon); Anne Orford, Beyond Harmonization: Trade, Human Rights, 
and the Economy of Sacrifice, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 179, 197–98 (2005) (arguing that trade agreements 
demand the sacrifice of public values both in favor of the global market and as the price of inclusion in 
the community of believers). 
 281.  See, e.g., Yasutami Shimomura & Izumi Ohno, Introduction and Overview, in TRUE 
OWNERSHIP AND POLICY AUTONOMY: MANAGING DONORS AND OWNING POLICIES 1, 2–9 (Izumi Ohno 
ed., 2005) (defining ownership to include the capacity to determine aid agendas locally); cf., Kweku 
Ampiah, The Discourse of Local Ownership in Development: Rhapsodies About “Self-Help” in Japan’s 
Economic Assistance to Africa, 32 JAPANESE STUD. 168, 179 (2012) (noting that “self-help” in Japan is 
“more an exhortation than a well-defined and coherent principle”). 
 282.  John Gillespie & Pip Nicholson, Taking the Interpretation of Legal Transfers Seriously: The 
Challenge for Law and Development, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE GLOBAL DISCOURSES OF 
LEGAL TRANSFERS, supra note 170, at 1, 6 (“Privileging the knowledge and strategies for reform from 
the West means less emphasis, if indeed any emphasis, is placed on the demands of aid recipients.  The 
focus is squarely on the supply side of the aid equation.”). 
 283.  See Frank Schimmelfennig, A Comparison of the Rule of Law Promotion Policies of Major 
Western Powers, in RULE OF LAW DYNAMICS: IN AN ERA OF INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE 111, 113 (Michael Zürn et al. eds., 2013) (arguing that there are similarities in the rule of 
law promotion policies of the United States, the EU, the UK, France, and Germany, each of which 
embraces a top-down promotion of the rule of law with an emphasis on  
“formal and institutional aspects”). 
 284.  See, e.g., David K. Linnan, The New, New Legal Development Model, in LEGITIMACY, LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE: LAW AND MODERNIZATION RECONSIDERED, supra note 86, at 21, 23–24 
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Other models of legal development have arisen in the last decade.  The 
Japanese International Cooperation Agency, for example, advocates a 
much more locally-based and locally-developed system of legal 
assistance,285 arguably eschewing the Washington consensus.286  The role 
that China and Korea will play in the law and development domain over 
time is currently unclear, although interest has increased in their activities. 
These criticisms exist independently of any criticism premised on 
impact and suggest that the sovereignty of nations, particularly those 
nations with worldviews (such as socialism or Islamic and other religious 
systems of law) that are different from those of Western donors, are 
marginalized or coopted.287  These criticisms, which take international law 
and development and Western-style law and development as their focus, 
have merit.  This Article, however, is more concerned with the emergence 
of a co-evolutionary pattern in law and development (ambition and 
criticism of impact) and calls for a return to a humbler and more locally-
owned experience of law in development before anyone decries its very 
essence. 
Effectively, by combining an ever-growing level of ambition with 
increased concern for impact, the field of law and development has become 
its own “straw man.”  Simply by expanding its promises with each 
paradigm and with each expansion within each paradigm, the field has set 
itself up for more—ironically, self-inflicted—criticism.  At times, the field 
seems to have reverted to its 1970s form, leaving scholars within the field 
“self-estranged” once again, being both key participants in and chief critics 
of the field.288  The notable difference, however, is that this time the 
ambitious endeavor has not been stopped by the publication of a single 
critical paper289 or even by the virtual tsunami of critical studies that have 
 
(“[P]olicy focus has been shifting toward an ill-defined “post-Washington Consensus,” understood 
more in opposition to neoclassical economics and Anglo-American capitalism post 2008 financial 
crisis, rather than articulating any clear policy stance.”). 
 285.  Taro Morinaga, Legal Technical Cooperation by Japan: Who We Are and What We Do, ICD 
NEWS: LAW FOR DEVELOPMENT, Dec. 2010, at 1, 10, available at http://www.moj.go.jp/content/ 
000110665.pdf (“[P]roviding support for legal and judicial reform means to support the efforts 
undertaken by developing countries to develop their legal and judicial systems” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 286.  Knieper, supra note 171, at 114. 
 287.  See, e.g., Nicholson & Low, supra note 167, at 19, 26 (reporting that actors in the legal 
development sector in Vietnam and Cambodia experienced a lack of donor respect for local 
sovereignty). 
 288.  Trubek & Galanter, supra note 1, at 1062–64. 
 289.  See Trubek & Santos, supra note 14 (describing the consequences for the original U.S. Law 
and Development movement following the publication of Trubek & Galanter’s paper on self-
estrangement). 
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come out over the last decade or so.  Quite the contrary, there has been an 
expansion rather than a retraction of law and development. 
To understand this, it is first necessary to look at the relationship 
between the ambition and limited impact of law and development.  
Ambition and limited impact have acted as co-evolutionary factors.  More 
ambition has created a demand for demonstrable impact, while mixed 
impact evaluations have created a space for scholars and practitioners to 
launch new ideas and concepts, which have in turn fostered additional 
ambition.  Scholars and practitioners have played a double role, supporting 
and developing new paradigms while criticizing older ones.  This has 
created a constant situation of self-estrangement, and yet ironically this 
self-estrangement has acted as a catalyst for further activity in the field. 
The co-evolution of ambition and limited impact should be understood 
both externally and internally to the field of law and development.  The 
expanded role for law in an expanded concept of development has placed 
the once-obscure field of law and development closer to the center of major 
national and international political debates, including those over state-
building, peace-building, good governance, human rights protection, 
development cooperation, and economic growth.  This means that law and 
development in particular and development more generally are no longer 
controlled by those inside them but are increasingly subject to external 
geopolitical forces.  As such, those criticizing law and development’s 
limited impact and even its high level of ambition are unable to counter the 
broader forces that sustain the paradigms and practices they seek to 
criticize.  Thus there is growing ambition combined with growing criticism. 
Furthermore, the players in the field of law and development have 
expanded exponentially over time.  This merely adds to the pressures on 
the field and renders an implosion, as seen in the 1960s, much less likely.  
Today many major multilateral organizations are engaged in the field, 
either directly through projects or indirectly through loans.290  In addition, 
there are now a host of bilateral donors actively engaged in rule of law, 
bottom-up justice, and customary justice activities.291  These new players 
 
 290.  Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic 
Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 4, 
at 253, 268; Briefs: Loans and Technical Assistance, ASIAN DEV. BANK, http://www.adb.org/news/ 
briefs (last visited May 29, 2014). 
 291.  See INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE, 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE LEGAL FIELD 12–13 (2003) (on file with 
authors) (offering a list of JICA supported aid projects); HERBERT KÜPPER, STRUCTURES OF JAPANESE 
AND GERMAN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CO-OPERATION: WITH FORMERLY SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 
COMPARED (Nagoya Univ. Ctr. for Asian Legal Exch., CALE Discussion Paper No. 5, 2011), available 
at http://cale.law.nagoya-u.ac.jp/_userdata/DP%20No.%205.pdf; Nicholson with Pitt, supra note 170, 
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are involved across the full spectrum of activities. 
As discussed above, many involved in law and development do not 
simply criticize but also offer suggestions or recommendations.  Those 
recommendations introduce extra ambition into the already overburdened 
field by broadening existing paradigms and even introducing new ones, 
most notably Bottom-Up Justice and Customary Justice.  Such 
recommendations are often based on criticism of existing approaches for 
their failure to tackle underlying socioeconomic and cultural structures.  
And following this analysis, scholars and practitioners thus propose to 
move from a formal institutional, legalistic orientation towards a local, 
bottom-up, informal, socioeconomic, and cultural orientation.  While 
external political forces continually demand institutional approaches 
oriented towards building highly visible, macro-level, formal institutions, 
scholars and practitioners have learned time and again that it is vital to 
build upon existing local practices and knowledge.  The combination of the 
two has created an ugly hybrid that contains the ambitions of both but is 
still largely driven by the top-down, quick-working practices of external 
politics.  This in turn draws more internal criticism and is followed by 
another round of recommendations that raise expectations even further. 
While, of course, most of the criticisms and suggestions discussed 
here are valid and highly important on their own, the overall picture is one 
of unbounded ambition and too limited understanding, from those both 
outside and inside the field, of the feasibility of law and development 
interventions. 
Law and development must thus embrace realism, pragmatism, and 
humility.  If the field continues as it does today, widespread cynicism or 
indeed despair will result.  Improving the functioning of legal institutions 
in developing countries is a “worthy” endeavor that will continue 
regardless of doubt, criticism, or theoretical debate.  Law and development 
can only be undertaken, however, with specific goals and targets in each 
collaboration or intervention; broad paradigms or approaches should be 
avoided.  The political forces external to the field will keep some of the 
existing paradigms—most notably Rule of Law, State-Building, and 
Transitional Justice—in place for the time being.  But scholars and 
 
at 209–19 (listing a range of bilateral donors involved in court-oriented legal reform in Vietnam).  On 
the motivations that impact donor activity, see Alberto Alesina & David Dollar, Who Gives Foreign Aid 
to Whom and Why?, 5 J. ECON. GROWTH 33, 33–34 (2000) (arguing that politics and strategic concerns, 
rather than economic or policy concerns, explain the targets of donor aid); Peter J. Schraeder et al., 
Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid 
Flows, 50 WORLD POL. 294, 319–23 (1998) (arguing that a host of factors, including ideological 
alignment and strategic and trade interests but not including humanitarian concerns, influenced 
Japanese, French, U.S., Swedish, and Canadian support for foreign aid to Africa during the 1980s). 
VAN ROOIJ AND NICHOLSON MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2014  3:27 PM 
348 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 24:297 
practitioners should resist the temptation to put their efforts under these 
flags uncritically. 
Law and development must not seek to improve the development of 
the world by building and expanding major paradigms or by claiming to be 
some magical panacea based on correlations of simplistic law and 
development indicators.  Rather it must adopt a combination of patience, 
long-term commitment, and incrementalism, implementing interventions 
that have specific and feasible goals and whose impact is checked through 
randomized trials and in-depth fieldwork by independent scholars.292 
Furthermore, and just as significantly, there is a need to empower the 
recipients of aid.  The aid “monologue,”293 driven and shaped by the West, 
needs to acknowledge the right of countries to determine their own reforms 
and to own them locally.294  This may involve a return to technical 
assistance alone (albeit reimagined to admit contests of ideas),295 enabling 
local stakeholders to debate the shape of their own reform trajectory. 
Finally, just as Developmental Economics is arguably being 
transformed by the down-to-earth realism of Poor Economics,296 perhaps 
Law and Development can turn into a pragmatic and empirically-driven 
Poor Justice that does not assume the supremacy of the West and its donors 
in development activities and that acknowledges the complex political and 
economic landscape into which it presumes to travel. 
 
 292.  See ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE & ESTHER DUFLO, POOR ECONOMICS: A RADICAL RETHINKING OF 
THE WAY TO FIGHT GLOBAL POVERTY 14–16 (2011) (arguing that randomized trials should be used to 
verify and refine developmental practices). 
 293.  PAUL MUS, LE DESTIN DE L’UNION FRANÇAISE: DE L’INDOCHINE A L’AFRIQUE 53 (1954) 
(characterizing the colonial project as a monologue in which the colonial subjects are not engaged). 
 294.  See Gillespie & Nicholson, supra note 282, at 6 (arguing that there is a focus on the supply 
side of law and development that marginalizes local recipients). 
 295.  See Newton, supra note 165, at 29–30 (suggesting a critical approach to the role of law could 
feature in technical legal assistance). 
 296.  See BANERJEE & DUFLO, supra note 292, at 14–16 (outlining the need for experimental 
approaches to development in economics). 
